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OLD SCHOOL GOES ONLINE: 
EXPLORING FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS OF LOYALTY 
AND CARE IN THE DIGITAL PLATFORMS ERA 
 
By Richard S. Whitt1 
“Study the past if you would define the future.” 
-Confucius  
 
 
As the World Wide Web has become a pervasive feature of life for 
billions of people, concerns are growing that new legal mechanisms 
are necessary to govern the activities of online service providers 
(OSPs). In particular, today’s Web ecosystems are presided over by 
multisided online platforms, extracting and analyzing personal data in 
the absence of express obligations to protect and promote their users’ 
interests. Not surprisingly, over the past twenty years scholars have 
begun reaching back to “old school” common law doctrines for 
guidance.  One promising legal field entails fiduciary duty-based 
relationships, which have a robust, globe-spanning history stretching 
hundreds of years.  The latest such approach is the information 
fiduciaries (IF) model, introduced by academics Jack Balkin and 
Jonathan Zittrain.   
The IF model posits that OSPs should be required to abide by 
fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and confidentiality with regard to their 
end users.  A recent draft paper by Lina Khan and David Pozen, 
however, sees an unsolvable incongruity between a mandated duty of 
loyalty, and both the corporate law of Delaware, and the financial 
imperatives of online advertising-based companies such as Facebook.  
As it turns out, while the IF model’s creators invoke the fiduciary duty 
 
1 Currently fellow in residence with the Mozilla Foundation, senior fellow with the Georgetown 
Tech Law and Policy Institute, and president of GLIA Foundation.  My thanks to Mike Godwin, 
distinguished senior fellow at R Street Institute, for his thoughtful critique of an earlier paper 
draft, and his persuasive take on the relative importance of the fiduciary duty of confidentiality.  
My appreciation as well to Dr. Todd Kelsey, who supplied his usual trenchant analysis in his 
role as AI advisor to GLIA Foundation.  Finally, Alex Givens and her students in the 
Georgetown University Law Center’s Spring 2019 Tech Law Scholars Seminar provided their 
own useful suggestions regarding an initial version of this piece. 
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of loyalty, in reality their model relies on mandated obligations rooted 
only in care and confidentiality. 
Fortunately, the IF model does not exhaust the richness and depth 
of fiduciary law doctrine.  Another proposed approach is the “digital 
trustmediary” (DTM), a cornerstone feature of the GLIAnet project2).  
The DTM model involves entities providing advanced digital service to 
their clients, while voluntarily operating under heightened fiduciary 
duties of loyalty, care, and confidentiality.  The opt-in DTM model is 
positioned as a well-considered alternative to a current Web ecosystem 
generally lacking in bona fide fiduciary-like relationships.  The IF 
model of mandated care, and the DTM model of voluntary loyalty, 
present two different but complementary approaches to injecting 
greater trust and accountability in the Web. 
Finally, other tenets of the common law remain available for 
exploration.  Indeed, what could be termed “digital common law” 
holds the potential to contribute usefully to modern day conversations 
about the role of digital technologies in society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 To access the GLIAnet project, see GLIANET, www.glia.net (last visited Oct. 1, 2019).  
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
The concept of information fiduciaries has received considerable 
attention in recent years as one way to impose greater societal 
obligations on Web-based entities. This paper probes the information 
fiduciaries concept as a useful entrée into a broader discussion of how 
to bring longstanding legal institutions into the online digital world. 
This Article has five primary objectives.  First, it will describe the 
information fiduciary (IF) model, as laid out by scholars Jack Balkin 
and Jonathan Zittrain, which was criticized recently by Lina Khan and 
David Pozen.  Second, it will undertake a deeper dive into the basics of 
the common law of fiduciary obligations, including the twin duties of 
care and of loyalty. Third, the paper will examine the information 
fiduciaries model from the standpoint of traditional common law and 
modern-day commentary. 
Fourth, the paper will explore a proposed alternative legal model, 
the “digital trustmediary” (or DTM), with entrusted entities voluntarily 
acting under a heightened fiduciary duty of loyalty, and an enabling 
duty of confidentiality, to their clients. This DTM model will be posited 
as a viable response to the current Web ecosystem, which is presided 
over by online platforms extracting and analyzing end user data in the 
absence of express fiduciary obligations. 
The paper concludes by suggesting ways to meld together the two 
different but complementary IF and DTM fiduciary approaches in the 
context of Web-based entities. Consistent with this Author’s prior 
written work on functional openness, 3  the overarching intention is to 
breathe productive new life into old school legal doctrines.  In this case, 
a brief trip down well-worn paths from the past should prove 
instructive. 
I.  THE INFORMATION FIDUCIARIES MODEL AND ITS CRITICS 
A. Background 
Since the dawn of the Web, people have sought to link traditional 
notions of intermediaries and fiduciary obligations to the digital world.  
Such proposals have centered on the roles of managing and protecting 
user data and information.  
In 1996, for example, Kenneth Laudon described a scenario where 
agents that he called “information fiduciaries” would manage 
 
3 Richard Whitt, Hiding in the Open: How Tech Network Policies Can Inform Openness by 
Design (and Vice Versa), 3 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 28, 66-74 (2018). 
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information deposited by end users.4 Three years later, in Net Worth, 
John Hagel and Marc Singer introduced the term “infomediary” to 
describe a customer agent that extracts monetary value from the 
customer’s information.5 In 2008, on the more defensive front, Neil 
Richards explained the necessity of subjecting search engines, online 
bookstores, and other “information fiduciaries” to regulation, including 
“meaningful requirements of confidentiality.”6 
In brief, these early camps were divided. Some like Laudon touted 
the possibility of affirmative, marketplace-based duties between 
willing parties, while Richards and others proposed government 
mandates to safeguard user privacy interests.   
Beginning in 2015, scholars Jack Balkin and Jonathan Zittrain 
have developed the concept of an “information fiduciary” (IF)7 which 
would be applied to a category of online service providers (OSPs).  
Balkin and Zittrain have stated that the IF concept would impose legal 
duties akin to those found in the traditional common law doctrine of 
fiduciary obligations.8 
By mid-2019, support in the United States for regulating OSPs as 
information fiduciaries had grown appreciably. Other scholars and 
commentators began expressing their backing to the IF model.9  
Federal legislation containing OSP fiduciary obligations was 
 
4 Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, 39 COMM. OF THE ACM 92, 101 (Sept. 1996).  
5 JOHN HAGEL III & MARC SINGER, NET WORTH: SHAPING MARKETS WHEN CUSTOMERS 
MAKE THE RULES 40-42 (1999). 
6 Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 436 (Dec. 2008); see also NEIL 
RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 168 
(2015) (describing information fiduciaries dealing in intellectual data); see also DANIEL J. 
SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2006) 
(suggesting how exploring fiduciary law is a way to deal with data brokers); see also Ian Kerr, 
The Legal Relationship Between Online Service Providers and Users, 35 CAN. BUS. L.J. 419 
(2001) (concluding that some Internet Service Provider (ISP)-end user interactions display the 
constitutive elements of a fiduciary relationship). 
7 The Balkin/Zittrain information fiduciary model will be termed as “IF” throughout this paper 
to delineate it from earlier instantiations of the more general concept. 
8 See infra.   
9 See, e.g., ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN 
INFORMATION AGE 85-88 (2018) (articulating support for the IFs model as an alternative to a 
“notice-and-choice” regime); MIKE GODWIN, THE SPLINTERS OF OUR DISCONTENT: HOW TO FIX 
SOCIAL MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY WITHOUT BREAKING THEM  29-38 (May 14, 2019) 
(expressing support for Facebook and other OSPs to adduce to fiduciary law-based standards 
like information fiduciaries); ROGER MCNAMEE, ZUCKED 247, 260 (Feb. 5, 2019) (like doctors 
and lawyers, companies should act as fiduciaries to protect the interests of consumers); Neil 
Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 
431, 457-58 (2016) (supporting the IFs concept as a way to protect user privacy). 
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endorsed,10 and subsequently  introduced.11 Launch of a Harvard 
University-based “Information Fiduciary Consortium” was 
announced.12 A recent Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
Chairman weighed in favorably on applying common law obligations 
to online entities.13 Even Mark Zuckerberg gave a “thumbs up” to 
Facebook being treated as a fiduciary.14 
In late February 2019, however, scholars Lina Khan and David 
Pozen published an initial draft law journal article entitled A Skeptical 
View of Information Fiduciaries.15 As the name suggests, the authors 
leveled substantial criticism on the IF concept as a poor legal and 
practical fit to platform companies like Facebook. 
B. The “Information Fiduciaries” Proposal 
In an April 2016 law journal article, Information Fiduciaries and 
the First Amendment,16 Balkin first laid out the case for IFs in some 
detail. He explained that OSPs are in a special position to collect, 
analyze, use, sell, and distribute their end users’ personal information. 
In his view, those entities – which include search engines, social 
networks, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), email providers, and cloud 
companies – should be induced to take on fiduciary responsibilities.17 
Balkin stressed that “there is no single class of fiduciary duties 
that applies equally in all situations.”18 Noting the two basic common 
 
10 See, e.g., Adam Schwartz & Cindy Cohn, “Information Fiduciaries” Must Protect your Data 
Privacy, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Oct. 25, 2018), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/10/information-fiduciaries-must-protect-your-data-privacy. 
11 In mid-December 2018, U.S. Senator Brian Schatz (D-HI) and fourteen co-signors released 
Senate Bill 3744, the “Data Care Act of 2018,” which includes express duties of care, loyalty, 
and confidentiality applied to OSPs regarding their uses of personal data. See Data Care Act of 
2018, S. 3744, 115th Cong. (2018); see also Schwartz & Cohn, supra note 10.  
12 See Berkman Klein Center, Where’s My Data? Data Transparency, 
https://berkmancenter.github.io/datatransparency (last visited Sept. 21, 2019).  The website 
currently includes a link to an undated document asking companies to join the “Information 
Fiduciary Consortium,” but no further information appears to be available online. 
13 Tom Wheeler, The Root of the Matter: Data and Duty, HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL, 
SHORENSTEIN CENTER ON MEDIA, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY, Nov. 2018, at 10-11 (rules 
for the new digital economy should include the common law concept of a duty of care). 
14 Josh Constine, Highlights & transcript from Zuckerberg’s 20K-word ethics talk, 
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 20, 2019, 3:05 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/02/20/zuckerberg-
harvard-zittrain/zuck interview [hereinafter Zuckerberg Harvard Interview Transcript]. 
15 A subsequent version of the article was posted on May 25, 2019 and provides the basis for 
this analysis.  Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 
133 HARV. L. REV.  (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 1) (on file with SSRN).  
16 See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 
1183 (Apr. 2016) [hereinafter Information Fiduciaries].   
17 Id. at 1186.  
18 Id. at 1225. 
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law fiduciary duties of care and of loyalty, Balkin explains that his 
concept is that OSPs should “act in ways that do not harm the interests 
of” their end users.19 OSPs should not betray confidence that they 
induce, and otherwise “act like con men.”20 By contrast, the traditional 
duties of loyalty applied to doctors and lawyers “are often quite broad 
and strong,” and “people do not expect the same degree of concern 
from online service providers.”21 Because the information practices of 
fiduciaries differ from those involving ordinary strangers, reasonable 
obligations placed on information fiduciaries would not violate the 
First Amendment.22  
In a subsequent paper, Balkin again emphasized that digital 
information fiduciaries “should have fewer obligations than traditional 
professional fiduciaries like doctor, lawyers, and accountants.”23 He 
reasoned that users do not expect comprehensive obligations of care 
from “special-purpose information fiduciaries” like their ISPs, search 
engines, and social media.24 He repeated that these entities’ “central 
obligation is that they cannot act like con artists.”25 
In late 2016, Zittrain joined Balkin in penning an article calling 
for a “grand bargain organized around the idea of fiduciary 
responsibility.”26 Online companies would agree to take on the 
obligations of IFs – which the authors explained were primarily not to 
unfairly discriminate against, or abuse the trust of, their end users. In 
exchange, Congress could offer special immunities and safe harbors 
from uncertain legal liabilities. If done correctly, they argued, this 
trade-off would institute “the duty to use personal data in ways that 
don’t betray end users and harm them.”27 
In a New York Times editorial published in April 2018, Zittrain 
explained IFs in the realm of data sharing scandals at Facebook.28  
 
19 Id. at 1186. 
20 Id. at 1224. 
21  Id. at 1225-26.  
22 See Information Fiduciaries, supra note 16, at 1209-1225. 
23 Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and 
New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1163 (2018) (hereinafter Free 
Speech in the Algorithmic Society).  
24 Id. at 1162-63. 
25 Id. at 1163. 
26 Jack M. Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain to Make Tech Companies Trustworthy, 
THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/information-fiduciary/502346/.  
27 Id. 
28 Jonathan Zittrain, Mark Zuckerberg Can Still Fix This Mess, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 7, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/07/opinion/sunday/zuckerberg-facebook-privacy-
congress.html. 
2019] OLD SCHOOL GOES ONLINE  83 
Zittrain saw one answer in Facebook accepting societal obligations as 
an IF, which would demand Facebook to “not betray our interests.”29  
As Zittrain explains it: 
Mr. Zuckerberg has the power to shake things up.  He could 
bind his company to practices and technologies aimed at a sea 
change on user privacy and autonomy.  Rather than circling 
the wagons, Facebook can join the cause.  If it doesn’t, people 
should disperse to platforms that will.30 
Balkin’s most recent works invoke the IF model in the context of 
market challenges with social media.31 In these papers he more 
explicitly claims that the fiduciary duty of loyalty would apply to IFs.32  
He argues that this new obligation would “make social media 
companies internalize the costs they impose on society through 
surveillance, addiction, and manipulation by giving them new social 
responsibilities.”33 What this duty of loyalty means in practice, he 
emphasizes, depends on the nature of the business, and the reasonable 
expectations of its users.34 Even so, he repeats the notion from his 
previous papers that the obligations for these entities would remain 
more limited than for other types of information fiduciaries. As he puts 
it succinctly: 
Facebook is not your doctor.  YouTube is not your accountant 
or estate manager.  We should be careful to tailor the fiduciary 
obligations to the nature of the business and to the reasonable 
expectations of consumers. That means that social media 
 
29  Id.  
30 Id.  Zuckerberg’s March 6, 2019 announcement of a major shift in Facebook’s business 
model, from the “town square” of social media to the “living room” of private communications, 
is a fascinating pivot point. See Mark Zuckerberg, A Privacy-Focused Vision for Networking, 
FACEBOOK (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/a-privacy-
focused-vision-for-social-networking/10156700570096634/.  Putting aside skepticism about 
motivations and follow-through, the new model arguably would comport better to a certain 
scope of fiduciary obligation than the company’s existing social media platform. 
31 See Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011 (2018) [hereinafter 
Free Speech is a Triangle]; see also Jack M. Balkin, The First Amendment in the Second Gilded 
Age, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 979 (Dec. 1, 2018) [hereinafter Second Gilded Age]; see also Jack M. 
Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217 (2017) 
[hereinafter Three Laws of Robotics]; see also JACK M. BALKIN, FIXING SOCIAL MEDIA’S 
GRAND BARGAIN (Oct. 15, 2018), 
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/balkin_webreadypdf.pdf [hereinafter 
Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain]. 
32 Fixing Social’s Media’s Grand Bargain, supra note 31, at 12-13; Free Speech Is a Triangle, 
supra note 31, at 2048; Second Gilded Age, supra note 31, at 1009; Three Laws of Robotics, 
supra note 31, at 1229. 
33 Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain, supra note 31, at 11. 
34 Second Gilded Age, supra note 31, at 1009. 
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companies’ fiduciary duties will be more limited.35 
In his later works, Balkin notes again that, “[a]t base, the [duty] of 
loyalty mean[s] that digital fiduciaries many not act like con artists” by 
“creat[ing] an unreasonable risk of harm to their end users.”36   
C. The Khan/Pozen Response 
As indicated above, the Balkin/Zittrain proposal on IFs has 
engendered a range of positive responses. Nonetheless, the 
Khan/Pozen draft paper released online in May 2019 makes no bones 
about its intention to “disrupt the emerging consensus” of support.37  In 
fact, Khan and Pozen see the proposed IF model as “moving the 
conversation backward” on how to regulate digital firms such as 
Facebook.38 
The paper’s initial critique focuses on how the officers and 
directors of a Delaware corporation already owe a core duty of loyalty 
to stockholders. The authors claim that this obligation is deeply 
inconsistent with any similar duty imposed on behalf of end users.  
Khan and Pozen argue that Facebook would be unable to manage the 
divided loyalties of its stockholders versus its users, especially since 
the company ostensibly would own a higher duty of loyalty to its 
stockholders.39  In other words, “the business model matters.”40 
The authors also point out that noted legal experts have argued for 
two different interpretations of the duty of loyalty. The thinner, 
“prescriptive” account requires that the fiduciary avoid conflicts 
between self-interest and fulfilment of its duty to the beneficiary.41 The 
thicker, “prospective” account requires an affirmative devotion 
towards the beneficiary.42  Khan and Pozen submit that Facebook could 
pass neither test with regard to its business model and users, and so this 
fundamental misalignment renders the duty of loyalty implausible.43 
 
35 Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain, supra note 31, at 12. 
36 Id. at 13, 14. 
37 Khan & Pozen, supra note 15 (manuscript at 2).  
38 Id. (manuscript at 39).  The information fiduciaries framework “invites an enervating 
complacency about issues of structural power and a premature abandonment of more robust 
visions of public regulation.”  Id. (manuscript at 5). 
39 Id. (manuscript at 5-10). 
40 Id. (manuscript at 17). 
41 Id. (manuscript at 15).  
42 Id. (manuscript at 15-16).  
43 Khan & Pozen, supra note 15 (manuscript at 17).  The authors point out that Facebook’s 
business model does not just affect its end users.  Advertisers, content producers, nonusers, and 
other “dependent parties” are affected as well – and yet they are not included within the 
protections of the fiduciary obligation.  Id. (manuscript at 17). 
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The paper notes that a power-based argument for the duty of 
loyalty depends on two prongs: (1) “the fiduciary possesses 
professional skills and competencies that the beneficiary lacks”, and 
(2) using those services requires the disclosure of personal information 
that the fiduciary could exploit.44 Khan and Pozen find that neither 
prong applies to Facebook: they have no special expertise to run a 
social media platform, and the users’ exposure is simply “the price that 
online providers have chosen to set.”45 
Khan and Pozen also find what they call second-order information 
asymmetries (where the beneficiary understands the core elements of 
the relationship, but not the technical details), as well as first-order 
information asymmetries (where the beneficiary lacks even this core 
shared understanding).46 This “elaborate system of social control” 
cannot be squared with any meaningful fiduciary duty.47 
Finally, the authors concede that the information fiduciaries 
model appears superficially attractive from a theoretical, political, and 
aesthetic perspective.48 Nonetheless, as a government-imposed 
limitation on protected speech, the IF model still would violate the First 
Amendment, and leave many problems unaddressed, including the 
need for pro-competition reforms.49 As they conclude, “[w]e can 
regulate the dominant online platforms as information fiduciaries or we 
can target their market dominance and business models, but very likely 
we will not do both.”50  
 
II. GETTING GROUNDED IN THE COMMON LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 
Recent public policy conversations about regulating OSPs – 
including the IF model proposal – hinge on adopting and applying the 
relevant substance of fiduciary obligations. It is surprising, then, that 
the supporting documents do not dig more deeply into the richness of 
common law doctrine. This Part will do just that, albeit in an 
abbreviated way. The premise is that the explanatory roots of fiduciary 
accountability can provide considerable guidance, as we sort through 
whether and how such old school duties should apply to the burgeoning 
new world of Web-based entities and activities. 
 
44 Id. (manuscript at 18).  
45 Id. (manuscript at 18-19). 
46 Id. (manuscript at 20-21).  
47 Id. (manuscript at 21). 
48 Khan & Pozen, supra note 15 (manuscript at 29-30). 
49 Id. (manuscript at 30-37). 
50 Id. (manuscript at 36). 
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A. Complex and Contextual Roots 
The law of fiduciary relationships is a complex one, entwined with 
centuries of equity, torts, and other common law doctrine. Fiduciary 
law principles have been applied across a vast array of human 
endeavors,51 and most major global cultures.52  More recently, elements 
of this private law regime have been extended by scholars to the public 
law realm, as articulated in the “fiduciary theory of government” for 
both citizens’ relationships to their own governments,53 and to human 
rights vis-à-vis international institutions.54 Some scholars even believe 
the U.S. Constitution itself should be viewed as a fiduciary instrument, 
premised on power of attorney-like obligations of care, loyalty, and 
impartiality.55 
Recently, there has been a renaissance of sorts in the study and 
application of fiduciary doctrine. As leading fiduciaries law scholar 
Tamar Frankel has aptly noted, “throughout the centuries the problems 
that these laws were designed to solve are eternal, etched in human 
nature, derived from human needs, and built into human activities.”56  
Over time, fiduciary duty has become a legal category unto itself, 
embracing a range of different types of entities and relationships.57 At 
its core, however, the law of fiduciaries provides for the assignment of 
certain moral and legal obligations to people and entities engaged in 
exchanges of value with each other. 
Despite (or perhaps due to) the lengthy history of fiduciaries in 
common law, some find that “[t]here is considerable uncertainty over 
the basis, nature, and scope of fiduciary duties as well as their 
 
51 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller, & Robert H. 
Sitkoff eds., 2019).  Entire book chapters separately cover agency, trust law, corporate law, 
nonprofits law, banking, pension law, employment law, bankruptcy, family law, legal 
representation, health care, public affairs, and international law.  Id. at 23-363. 
52 Legal systems discussed at length include English common law, canon law, Roman law, 
classical Islamic law, classical Jewish law, European civil systems, Chinese law, Indian law, 
and Japanese law.    Id. at 471-663. 
53 See FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT (Evan J. Criddle, Evan Fox-Decent, Andrew S. Gold, Sung 
Hui Kim, & Paul B. Miller eds., 2018).  
54 See FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY (Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent eds., 2016).  
55 See GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY: UNDERSTANDING THE 
FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION (2017). 
56 TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 79 (Dec. 17, 2010). 
57 Classically, economists see fiduciary law as a response to a principal-agent problem, where 
one party undertakes imperfectly observable discretionary actions that affect the interests of the 
principal. Andrew Gold & Paul Miller, Introduction, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 8 
(Andrew Gold & Paul Miller eds., 2014).  Frankel’s view, and that of many other scholars, is 
that this contracts law-derived perspective unnecessarily narrows the conception of a robust 
fiduciary relationship. 
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justification.”58  In part, “fiduciary obligation eludes theoretical capture 
because it arises in diverse types of relationships.”59 As a result, the 
doctrine is uniquely bound to the relevant context.60 
B. A Basis in Entrusted Power 
The crucial linchpin of every fiduciary obligation is what Frankel 
calls “entrusted power,” affecting the existence, nature, and rules of 
such relationships.61 The core concept is that an individual or entity 
(the “entrustor”) grants access to property, or some other thing of value, 
to specified fiduciaries, for the purpose of having them undertake tasks 
that benefit the entrustor.62  Or as scholar Paul Miller puts it, a fiduciary 
relationship is one in which one party exercises discretionary power 
over the significant practical interests of another.63 In fiduciary 
relationships, “entrustors are always the vulnerable party.”64 
To Frankel, “all definitions [of fiduciaries] share three main 
elements: (1) [the] entrustment of property or power; (2) [the] 
entrustors’ trust of fiduciaries, and (3) [the] risk to entrustors emanating 
from the entrustment.”65 In particular, fiduciaries offer expert, and 
usually socially desirable, services, and are granted the property or 
power to carry out their duties.  So, fiduciary relationships often carry 
a unique blend of the extent of entrustment, degrees of trust, and levels 
of risk.  Likelihood of a failed relationship can come from entrustors 
failing to protect themselves, markets failing to protect entrustors, or 
where the costs for fiduciaries to establish their trustworthiness exceeds 
their benefits from the relationship.66 
C. Deepening the Queries: Why, What, Who, and How 
At this juncture it would be useful to break out fiduciary doctrine 
into its basic components. These include understanding why there are 
such duties in the first place, what are the interests at stake, who are the 
 
58 Paul B. Miller, The Fiduciary Relationship, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY 
LAW 63 (Gold & Miller eds., 2014).  
59 Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 
879, 908 (1988).  
60 See id. at 909. 
61 Frankel, supra note 56, at 7. 
62 See id. at 9. 
63 Miller, supra note 58, at 69 (explaining the definition as part of his “fiduciary powers 
theory”). 
64 Frankel, supra note 56, at 26. 
65 Id. at 4.  That risk in turn depends on the types of services provided, “the nature and 
magnitude of the entrusted property and power, and the efficient control over the fiduciaries’ 
ability to abuse the” entrustor.  Id. at 25. 
66 See id. at 6-9.  
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players involved, and how are the substantive standards defined and 
applied.   
1. The Why: Trust versus Power 
The simplest question is, why does fiduciary law exist in the first 
place? Frankel’s response is straightforward: the duty of loyalty is 
rooted in asymmetric power relationships between two parties.67  Once 
a relationship has been established, fiduciaries enjoy power over 
beneficiaries.68  Others concur.69  Miller observes that power may mean 
a number of things in different contexts, including “control, authority, 
strength, or influence,” among others.70   
Not surprisingly, entrusted power rises with the number of 
entrustors, and the amount of entrusted assets.71 In turn, the formation 
of an actual fiduciary relationship involves three related structural 
properties between the fiduciary and the beneficiary/entrustor: 
inequality, dependence, and vulnerability.72 One basis of the 
fiduciary’s power over the entrustor is the disparity of knowledge, 
expertise, and experience between the two parties.73 Nonetheless, the 
source of entrusted power, and conflicting interests, often can be 
hidden from the beneficiaries.74 As a result, the issue of trust emerges 
over and over again as the pivotal consideration.75 
For the most part, common law recognizes services that require 
certain levels of expertise or experience in the fiduciary, that otherwise 
are lacking in the beneficiary.  Prime examples include the medical 
profession, the legal profession, and certain financial sectors.  
Entrustment of power or property to those providing these kinds of 
services triggers the obligation. 
 
 
67 See generally id. at 107-109.  
68 Id.  
69 See generally, Gold & Miller, supra note 57.  
70 Miller, supra note 58, at 69-70. 
71 Frankel, supra note 56, at 11. 
72 Miller, supra note 58, at 73. D. Gordon Smith believes that where parties rely on legal 
constraints for protection, “they are not trusting at all, but instead relying on the law of fiduciary 
duty for protection.  Such reliance displaces trust.”  D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource 
Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1418 (2002) (emphasis in original). 
73 Frankel, supra note 56, at 18.  Support for Frankel’s approach is not universal.  Smith claims 
that her aspiration to develop a universal framework fails to provide the necessary content to the 
concept of power.  Smith, supra note 72, at 1426 
74 Tamar Frankel, The Rise of Fiduciary Law, 18-18 B.U. SCH. OF L., PUB. L. RES. PAPER, Aug. 
2018, at 6 (hereinafter The Rise of Fiduciary Law).  
75 Frankel, supra note 56, at 38; see also Rise of Fiduciary Law, supra note 74, at 9. 
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2. The What: Personal and Practical Interests 
The entrustment of power means shifting decisional control over 
something. What is that something? Traditionally, the gravamen of the 
relationship has been a type of tangible asset, such as a financial 
instrument or real property. In some legal trusts, however, the 
healthcare of the entrustor is at issue; in others, the legal status. 
Because fiduciary power is relational, the “what” is limited only 
by what is deemed important to the entrustor. As a result, often the 
relationship deals with, and profoundly affects, people’s practical 
interests, even to more intangible matters of personality, welfare, or 
rights.76 D. Gordon Smith posits for example that the gravamen of 
fiduciary duties is a “critical resource,” which includes tangible 
property, but of which the most important category is confidential 
information.77 
So, the “what” of fiduciary power extends to information derived 
from the underlying relationship.  Brooks points out that “relational 
knowledge” – special information that fiduciaries acquire about their 
beneficiaries – is key to the economic logic and the law supporting 
these relationships.78 These entities “[o]ftentimes [have] even more 
knowledge, in some respects, than beneficiaries possess about 
themselves,” which includes “knowing their beneficiaries’ personal 
and otherwise private information . . . .79 But the reach is broader than 
that. As Brooks goes on to explain: 
In addition to knowing their beneficiaries’ personal and 
otherwise private information, fiduciaries normally have or 
should have superior knowledge concerning the external 
circumstances to which this information may be put to use in 
the context of their relationship as well as beyond.80 
So, entrusted power relationships encompass many forms of 
tangible and intangible “stuff,” often of a deeply personal nature, 
subject to a defined range of discretionary decisions and actions. 
 
 
76 Miller, supra note 58, at 72-73. 
77 See Smith, supra note 72, at 1441-1444. 
78 Richard R W Brooks, Knowledge in Fiduciary Relations, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF FIDUCIARY LAW 241 (Gold & Miller, 2014).  
79 Id. at 237-38.  
80 Richard R W Brooks, Observability and Verifiability: Informing the Information Fiduciary, 
U. OF CHI. L. SCH. 19 (Oct. 9, 2015), 
https://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/brooks_observability_verifiability.pdf [hereinafter 
Observability and Verifiability].  
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3. The Who: Status and Consent 
Another gating question is to whom fiduciary obligations should 
be applied in the first place. Generally speaking, fiduciary duties either 
can be imposed (based on an entity’s status, its specific role vis-à-vis 
its customers) or assumed (based on the entity’s consent to take on the 
enunciated duties.81 
The “status” finding often is based on the answer to the What 
question: an entity’s access to sensitive information about a person, 
such as health, wealth, and criminal or civil culpability. Such access 
entails a necessary degree of trust between the parties. So, attorneys 
and their clients, physicians and their patients, guardians and their 
wards, clergy and their parishioners, and (some) financial agents and 
their clients – all can be considered in more “formal” fiduciary 
relationships.82 
By contrast, “consent” status relates to an entity’s voluntary 
undertaking or “holding itself out” to, a specified fiduciary standard.  
These duties can be laid out in places like professional codes of conduct 
or industry principles. Scholars, such as Edelman,  suggest that all 
meaningful forms of fiduciary relationships arise in consensual 
settings, where fiduciaries have voluntarily undertaken their 
obligations.83 On the other hand, courts tend “to impose fiduciary 
duties where one party has a continuing authority or power over 
another, which is” difficult “to monitor and control, and which exposes 
the entrusting party to” domination, undue influence, or a special 
vulnerability.84 
According to one scholar, there are three principal modes of 
authorizing or requiring a fiduciary relationship: mutual consent of the 
parties, unilateral undertaking by one party, and legal decree.85 The 
latter can be derived by court decisions, legislative acts, or regulations. 
4. The How: Care and Loyalty – and Other 
Obligations 
At the core of fiduciary obligation “lies a suite of duties designed 
to nullify any temptation to sacrifice the interests of the beneficiary.”86  
 
81 Joshua Getzler, Ascribing and Limiting Fiduciary Obligations, in in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 39-62 (Gold & Miller eds., 2014).  
82 Smith, supra note 72, at 1402, 1441. 
83 The Honorable Justice James Edelman, The Role of Status in the Law of Obligations, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 21 (Gold & Miller eds., 2014).  
84 Getzler, supra note 81, at 43; Smith, supra note 72, at 1403-04. 
85 Miller, supra note 58, at 74. 
86 Getzler, supra note 81, at 41. 
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Precisely how potential fiduciary obligations are carried out typically 
boil down to two separate sets of duties,87 both with roots in ancient 
concepts: 
• Duty of care: The fiduciary satisfies this standard by 
executing its services with prudence, attention, and 
proficiency.  This standard relates to the quality of the 
fiduciary’s performance of its services.  In some circles, this 
translates as well into not acting in a way that amounts to 
negligence, by not materially harming the entrustor. 
• Duty of loyalty: The fiduciary’s obligations relate directly to 
entrusted power and property, and amount to avowing 
conflicts of interest, as well as affirmatively promoting the 
interests of the client. 
There is some lively scholarly dispute over how these two sets of 
duties play out in fiduciary relationships. Most scholars believe, 
however, that the “duty of loyalty” is the single distinctive obligation 
at the core of fiduciary relationships.88  Indeed, “[a]cross jurisdictions 
and across theories, there is common ground on a basic conclusion: 
loyalty is vital in fiduciary relationships.”89 Indeed, “[w]ithout 
fiduciary loyalty, the relationships would arguably not be fiduciary at 
all.”90 Other experts acknowledge the fundamental divergence, but 
common fiduciary law foundations, between the two sets of duties.91 
The substance of these two duties is also less than perfectly 
settled.  Nonetheless, the core components, rationale, and trendlines are 
relatively well established in many jurisdictions. 
Fiduciary Care 
While duties of care abound in private law, particularly tort law, 
many commentators highlight a distinctive version in fiduciary law 
doctrine.92  In both versions, the party who exercises a sufficient degree 
of care is relieved of liability. In tort law, for example, this translates 
into the avoidance of injurious wrongs, or harm to the other party.93   
 
87 Frankel, supra note 56, at 106-07. 
88 Gold & Miller, supra note 57, at 1. 
89 Andrew Gold, The Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY 
LAW 386 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller, & Robert H. Sitkoff eds., 2019). 
90 Id. at 385, 403.  
91 See, e,g., Hanoch Dagan & Sharon Hannes, Managing our Money: The Law of Financial 
Fiduciaries as a Private Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 107-15 
(Gold &  Miller eds.,  2014) (two distinctive duties of loyalty and of care are found in trust 
law/fiduciary doctrine). 
92 John C.P. Goldberg, The Fiduciary Duty of Care, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY 
LAW 405, 405 (Criddle, Miller, & Sitkoff eds., 2019).  
93 See id. at 405-407. 
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The more unique fiduciary component, however, creates an 
additional objective standard, one of ordinary care, prudence, and 
diligence by a party with particular knowledge or skills carrying out its 
assigned duties.94 The rationale is that the fiduciary beneficiary is in a 
position of vulnerability vis-à-vis the fiduciary. So while the non-
fiduciary version of the duty is ordinary care (“harm avoidance”), the 
fiduciary version adds in the exercise of diligence and skill in one’s 
conduct (what has been termed “prudent conduct” or “proper 
performance”).95 In some legal circles this also can be seen as a variant 
on the standard of “gross negligence.”96 As a result, a fiduciary duty of 
care can be breached by an entity’s mis-performance, even absent any 
injury to the beneficiary.97 
The content of the duty of care can be highly contextual. For 
example, the obligation can be quite lax as applied in corporate law 
(shielded in part by the business judgment rule), while highly stringent 
in trust law (amounting to a relatively strict standard of prudence).98 
The substantive difference in standards derives from the divergent 
interests of the parties.99 
Fiduciary Loyalty 
Fiduciary loyalty clearly constitutes a higher standard than 
fiduciary care. In comparing the two, Frankel makes clear that the duty 
of care is “not as weighty and prohibitory.”100 
One can consider this duty [of care] to be weaker than the duty 
of loyalty.  In contrast to the duty of loyalty, which is linked 
to misappropriation of entrustment, a violation of the duty of 
care is linked to lack of expertise, inattention, and 
negligence.101 
Like the fiduciary duty of care, the fiduciary duty of loyalty 
contains its own core element.  In this case, as Andrew Gold explains, 
the “no-conflicts” rule has been deemed proscriptive (a “thou shall 
 
94 Id. at 408. 
95 Goldberg, supra note 92, at 408 (citing Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 
MCGILL L. J. 235, 282 (2011). 
96 Goldberg, Fiduciary Duty of Care, at 414-15; Hillary A. Sale, Fiduciary Law, Good Faith, and 
Publicness, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 763, 765-66 (Criddle, Miller, & 
Sitkoff eds., 2019). 
97 Goldberg, supra note 92, at 415. 
98 Dagan & Hannes, supra note 91, at 99. 
99 Id. 
100 Frankel, supra note 56, at 171.  
101 Frankel, supra note 56, at 169. 
2019] OLD SCHOOL GOES ONLINE  93 
not”).  This so-called “thin” version, based in part on the law of trusts, 
is composed of two elements. 
• Conflicts of interest (between the pursuit of self-interest, and 
the fulfillment of a duty to act for the benefit of the 
beneficiary). The “no profits” rule (fiduciary cannot gain from 
a conflicted transaction) often is subsumed within this bucket. 
• Conflicts of duty (between duty, and pursuit of others’ 
interests). This comes into play in particular when the 
fiduciary is serving multiple beneficiaries.102   
In most cases, the duty of loyalty goes beyond its proscriptive 
foundation. Typically, it is combined with the related fiduciary duty of 
care (prudent conduct), duty of good faith (faithfulness and devotion to 
the beneficiary), and duty of disclosure (shares accurate information), 
to create a prescriptive obligation to act in the best interests of the 
beneficiary. Again, the rationale is to protect the vulnerable party from 
opportunistic behavior.103 The content of the duty of loyalty “should 
depend on the potential for opportunism,” or abuse of power; the 
“duties become more intense as the fiduciary’s power grows.”104 
This “best interests” (sometimes referred to as “thick”105) notion 
is key to understanding the unique content of the loyalty obligation.106  
This composite form of loyalty “can be defined as a state of mind and 
a manner of behavior in which one person identifies with the other 
person’s interests.”107 Smith explains further that “the duty of loyalty 
requires the fiduciary to adjust her behavior on an ongoing basis to 
avoid self-interested behavior that wrongs the beneficiary.”108 To 
some, the duty amounts to advancing practical interests of 
beneficiaries;109 to others, adopting “other-regarding preference 
 
102 Gold, supra note 89, at 388.  
103 Id. at 401. 
104 Smith, supra note 72, at 1482. 
105 Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 513, 557-
59 (2015) (hereinafter Fiduciary Governance). From a Kantian philosophy perspective, one can 
discern the possibility of two types of loyalty at play.  The “thin” sense of loyalty is a technical, 
state-enforced obligation, while the “thick” sense of loyalty implies a specific emotional and 
intellectual orientation of selflessness towards one’s principals. See Irit Samet, Fiduciary Loyalty 
as Kantian Virtue, in Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law 139-40 (Gold & Miller eds., 
2014). 
106 To Frankel, the two key aspects of loyalty are that the fiduciary acts in the sole (or sometimes 
“best”) interest of the entrustor, and that there is no conflict of interests with the entrustor.  
Frankel, supra note 56, at 149-152. 
107 Id. at 107. 
108 Smith, supra note 72, at 1409. 
109 Fiduciary Governance, supra note 105, at 556. 
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functions.”110 In perhaps more quantifiable terms, the duty amounts to 
“demonstrable partiality.”111 
So, in brief, the standalone, “thin” fiduciary duty of loyalty can be 
thought of as the “no conflicts” obligation. The more expansive, 
composite or “thick” fiduciary duty of loyalty amounts to a “best 
interests” obligation.   
It is worth noting that the “fiduciaries governance theory” has 
been developed and applied to a variety of situations where there is no 
obvious designated individual or entity. While the loyalty standard 
itself largely remains the same, the object of the duty is an abstract, 
other-regarding purpose.112 In practice, this can include “statements of 
common purpose” for a specific mission.113 The classic example is the 
charitable purpose trust,114 but public benefits corporations, non-
profits, and even public corporations all can adopt such an object-
oriented loyalty duty.115 
By way of comparison, then, the general and fiduciary duties of 
care, as well as the “thin” version of loyalty, present as objective, 
“reasonable person” standards, and proscriptive (something to be 
avoided) in nature. By contrast, the “thick” duty of loyalty is a more 
subjective standard, prescriptive in nature (something to be done), 
based on what is perceived to be in the beneficiary’s best interest.116 
Put in medical terms, getting more exercise is prescriptive; avoiding 
alcohol is proscriptive. 
“Subsidiary” Fiduciary Obligations 
Additional fiduciary obligations recognized by courts of equity 
over many centuries include the duty of candor, duty of good faith, duty 
not to delegate the services to others, and the duty of confidentiality.117  
Typically they are subsumed as “subsidiary” or “implementing” 
 
110 Smith, Critical Resource Theory, supra note 72, at 1407 (citation omitted).  
111 Fiduciary Governance, supra note 105, at 547, 562-564. 
112 Id. at 563. 
113 Id. at 553 (emphasis in original). 
114 Gold, supra note 102, at 390 n.33. 
115 Relatedly, Lawson and Seidman believe that the relevant beneficiaries of the U.S. 
Constitution as a fiduciary instrument are “We the People … and our Posterity.”  GARY 
LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY 145-46 (2017). 
116 Lionel D. Smith, Can We Be Obliged to be Selfless, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
FIDUCIARY LAW 146-47 (Gold & Miller, 2014).   
117 Frankel, supra note 56, at 106-07, 121-31.  Brooks elaborates that duties that should apply 
while in a relation of trust or confidence include “duties to inquire, to inform, to speak with 
candor, and other knowledge-based obligations and presumptions.”  Observability and 
Verifiability, supra note 80, at 23 n.28. 
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obligations under either the duty of care or of loyalty.118 However, in 
some legal quarters the duty of confidentiality has been deemed an 
important supportive component of the “primary” fiduciary duties.119 
As we shall see in the following sections, the duty of confidentiality 
deserves special status in the digital environment as an “enabling” 
obligation that strengthens the more well-established fiduciary duties 
of care and of loyalty.   
III. EXAMINING THE INFORMATION FIDUCIARIES MODEL 
A. The Common Law 
The Zittrain/Balkin model for information fiduciaries rests on 
combining in a specific way the “Why,” the “What,” the “Who,” and 
the “How” elements of the common law. 
First, the rationale for the IF is based on how “Big Data” 
technology, at the heart of what Balkin calls the “Algorithmic Society,” 
mediates relationships of power and control between people.120 Balkin 
notes that the issue is not so much the technology, as the government 
or company using the technology as a means of control over others. 
The Algorithmic Age then is a struggle over the asymmetries of power, 
information, and transparency, stemming from the collection, 
transmission, use, and analysis of data. 121 Information fiduciaries are 
necessary to help right this imbalance. 
Second, the focus of the IF model is an end user’s data or 
information.  As Balkin paraphrases from a Silicon Valley saying, “Big 
Data is the new oil.”122  The model is intended to reach across the 
different types of data-based services provided by OSPs – namely, 
ISPs, social media platforms, and search engines.  The commonality is 
access to personal information that has been obtained from end users. 
Third, in the United States the information fiduciary obligation 
would be induced in some fashion by Congress.  While consistently 
speaking of an “obligation” imposed on OSPs, Balkin’s paper 
regarding IFs and the First Amendment also suggests that government 
incentives such as tax breaks, safe harbors, or legal immunities could 
be employed.123  More recently, Balkin and Zittrain have talked about 
imposing the duty as part of a “grand bargain” between policymakers 
 
118 Robert H. Sitkoff, Other Fiduciary Duties: Implementing Loyalty and Care, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 419, 419 (Criddle, Miller, & Sitkoff eds., 2019). 
119 See Smith, supra note 72, at 1411-14, 1465-67. 
120 Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society, supra note 23, at 1157. 
121 Id. at 1157, 1160. 
122 Id. at 1154 (citation omitted). 
123 Information Fiduciaries, supra note 16, at 1229. 
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and large platform companies.124 However, the proposal’s aim appears 
to be the adoption of a legal requirement, imposed on assumedly less-
than-willing entities. One can see this as a “status” approach, based on 
its application to specific entities in specific roles of power over 
personal data. 
Fourth, in substance if not in nomenclature, the IF model 
encompasses a general duty of care by OSPs. While Balkin explicitly 
invokes the duty of loyalty in his more recent papers, his reasoning and 
supporting examples do not in fact correspond to the common law 
doctrine. This conclusion obviously deserves some unpacking. 
1. Duties of loyalty and care  
Balkin emphasizes that the IF model’s obligation is weaker in 
some ways than the standard which is imposed on other information 
fiduciaries, such as physicians and lawyers.125 Unlike doctors, OSPs do 
not hold themselves out as taking care of end users in general, under 
“comprehensive obligations of care.” 126 Nor should they be required to 
“look out for the interests of clients and keep them from harming 
themselves or doing foolish things.”127 And, an OSP should not have 
“a positive obligation to stop asking people to reveal more of 
themselves in social media.”128 This standard does not sound like a 
“thick,” other-regarding version of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. 
In fact, the IF model translates into allowing considerable leeway 
to existing commercial models. OSPs, for example, should not be 
required to back away from their current ads-based businesses.129  
OSPs still would be allowed to use personal data, in ways that would 
not involve betrayal and harm to users. Balkin even concedes that 
collecting personal data in order to serve targeted ads “creates a 
perpetual conflict of interest between end users and social media 
companies;” rather than ban outright such a conflict, however, “the 
goal should be to ameliorate or forestall the conflicts of interest.”130  A 
 
124 Balkin & Zittrain, supra note 26. 
125 See Information Fiduciaries, supra note 16, at 1228. 
126 Id.  
127 Id.  
128 Id. at 1229.  “‘Fiduciary’ does not mean ‘not for profit.’”  Id. at 1227.  See also, Free Speech 
in the Algorithmic Society, supra note, 23, at 1162-63 (“digital information fiduciaries should 
have fewer obligations than traditional professional fiduciaries like doctors, lawyers, and 
accountants.”). Id. at 1163.  
129 See Information Fiduciaries, supra note 16, at 1227. 
130 Fixing Social’s Media’s Grand Bargain, supra note 31, at 12-13.   
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contrary tack of resolving such conflicts of interest decisively in favor 
of the end user would be a hallmark of the “thin” duty of loyalty.131 
Balkin does explain that “[t]he nature of their duties depends on 
the kind of business they present to the public . . . [what] seems like a 
breach of trust [] depend[s] on the kind of service that entities provide 
and what we would reasonably consider unexpected or abusive for 
them to do.”132 However, at some point the exceptions swallow up the 
rule. That would appear to be the case here. 
The proscriptive language that Balkin employs also demonstrates 
a focus on avoiding harms to end user. The IF should not misuse 
personal information,133 use sensitive information to the user’s 
disadvantage,134 “attempt or threaten to embarrass you,”135 manipulate 
you into voting a certain way,136 use data in unexpected ways to 
disadvantage you,137 betray end users or work against their interests,138 
or otherwise “create an unreasonable risk of harm to their end users.”139  
At the outset the IF model is intended to “counteract the most egregious 
examples of bad behavior.”140 The gravamen of all these scenarios 
seems to be “harming end users.” Needless to say, avoiding harm is the 
quintessential core of the general duty of care, and does not correspond 
to either version of the loyalty obligation. 
Does the IF model also include a fiduciary duty of care?  
Apparently so. Balkin concludes, for example, that Facebook violated 
the duty of care in the Cambridge Analytica scandal by not taking 
sufficient care or adequate steps to vet partners, audit and oversee 
operations, ensure third parties maintained care of the user data, or claw 
it back.141 That language certainly mirrors the “prudent conduct” core 
of the fiduciary duty of care. 
 
 
131 Second Gilded Age, supra note 31, at 1009.  One critic believes the IF model “sidestep[s] the 
conflict of interest issue,” when a data controller has a business interest in the data provided to it 
by an end user.  Sylvie Delacroix & Neil D. Lawrence, Bottom-up data Trusts: disturbing the 
‘one size fits all’ approach to data governance, INTERNATIONAL DATA PRIVACY LAW, 2019, at 
12-13.  This observation only buttresses the conclusion that the IF model does not in fact 
encompass either version of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. 
132 Information Fiduciaries, supra note 16, at 1228, 1229. 
133 See Information Fiduciaries, supra note 16, at 1223. 
134 Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society, supra note 23 at 1160. 
135 Information Fiduciaries, supra note 16, at 1227. 
136 Id.  
137 Id.  
138 Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society, supra note 23, at 1163. 
139 Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain, supra note 31, at 14. 
140 Id. at 11.  
141 Id. at 13-14. 
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2. Duty of confidentiality  
Balkin also invokes the duty of confidentiality as an obligation on 
equal par with the duties of care and of loyalty. Under the traditional 
common law treatment discussed above, this duty typically acts as one 
of a number of secondary, “subsidiary” obligations to the primary 
fiduciary duties. However, as Mike Godwin points out, given its unique 
supportive role vis-a-vis other fiduciary obligations, confidentiality 
merits special -- perhaps even co-equal -- status, vis-à-vis the 
“primary” duties.142  
Theorists have noted that although there is considerable overlap, 
confidential relationships can be distinguished from fiduciary 
relationships.143  Crucially, the concept of keeping confidences rests on 
the same foundations of entrusted power, private knowledge, and 
personal relationship that undergird in particular the fiduciary duty of 
loyalty. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of a bona fide fiduciary 
relationship in the absence of a binding confidentiality requirement.  
Guarding the secrecy of information provided as part of private 
communications would seem to be a key component to relationships 
built on both thin and thick forms of fiduciary loyalty.   
In key respects, then, confidentiality is a precursor and enhancer 
to forming a successful fiduciary relationship. As Godwin puts it 
succinctly, “confidentiality is the real trust-builder.”144 
For now, the salient question here is whether and how the IF 
model incorporates a duty of confidentiality. Balkin’s repeated 
rejection of any analogue to doctors and lawyers, which carry with 
them explicit confidentiality requirements, casts some doubt. At the 
same time, while the general and fiduciary duties of care can and likely 
do exist in many cases without an express confidentiality mandate, 
likely they would be the worse for it. 
In his most recent work on the IF model, Balkin ties together an 
obligation of care (do no harm) with keeping confidences: 
The duties of care and confidentiality require fiduciaries to 
secure customer data and not disclose it to anyone who does 
not agree to assume similar fiduciary obligations. In other 
words, fiduciary obligations must run with the data.145  
 
142 E-mail from Mike Godwin to author (August 22, 2019) (on file with author) (“Godwin to 
Whitt Private Communication”). 
143 See Smith, supra note 72, at 1465-67. 
144 Godwin to Whitt Private Communication, supra note 142. 
145 Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain, supra note 31, at 13. 
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Not disclosing a customer’s information to third parties would 
seem a core attribute to a duty of confidentiality. In this case, ascribing 
some benefit of the doubt supports acknowledging that the IF model is 
intended to include an obligation of confidentiality. 
Thus, the Zittrain/Balkin approach for information fiduciaries 
aims at improving power and control asymmetries between Web 
companies and their users. Some imprecise language aside (or perhaps 
indicia of a still-evolving standard), the IF model would impose both 
general and fiduciary duties of care, and a related duty of 
confidentiality, on a range of online entities regarding their use of their 
users’ personal information. 
B. The Khan/Pozen Critique 
Khan and Pozen’s basic argument is that the duty of loyalty is an 
ill-fitting remedy to the Facebooks of the world. Much of the challenge, 
the authors claim, is that anything beyond “do no harm” would clash 
directly with the overriding corporate imperative to maximize financial 
value from existing business models.146  To that extent, the Khan/Pozen 
analysis casts significant doubt on Congress’ ability to mandate a 
fiduciary duty of loyalty on U.S. corporations. 
As we have seen, however, the IF model is based squarely on 
duties of care, not of loyalty. Attributing a mandated fiduciary duty of 
loyalty is an understandable misreading, given Balkin’s invocation of 
that standard in his later papers.147 However, as highlighted above, 
Balkin and Zittrain appear to want no part of an actual fiduciary loyalty 
standard. So, the Khan/Pozen paper essentially is doing battle with an 
empty suit. 
Noting some of the internal inconsistencies in the actual duty 
involved, the Khan/Pozen paper suggests one reading that would 
“cabin any fiduciary duties afforded to users so that they do not 
seriously threaten firm value,” or the structure of the Delaware 
corporate fiduciary law.148  Otherwise: 
For if the concept of digital information fiduciaries does not 
require online platforms to place their users’ interests above 
all other interests, it is unclear what work the concept is 
supposed to be doing. More than that, it is unclear how this is 
 
146 Khan & Pozen, supra note 15 (manuscript at 21). 
147 Fixing Social’s Media’s Grand Bargain, supra note 31, at 12-13; Free Speech Is a Triangle, 
supra note 31, at 2048; Second Gilded Age, supra note 31, at 1009; Three Laws of Robotics, 
supra note 31, at 1228-29. 
148 Khan & Pozen, supra note 15 (manuscript at 12). 
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a fiduciary approach in any meaningful sense.149 
The cogent response to those questions is that the actual concept 
behind the IF model is to protect users from various harms and 
imprudent conduct, under general and fiduciary duties of care. Those 
duties do have some weight, and likely would prohibit more conduct 
than Federal law currently permits. If such mandates were imposed by 
Congress, for example, a corporation expressly maximizing 
shareholder value by deliberately harming its users would amount to a 
plain violation of the general duty of care. Similarly, a corporation 
performing its various responsibilities in an imprudent and 
irresponsible manner would amount to a violation of the fiduciary duty 
of care. It is difficult to imagine that Facebook shareholders, or officials 
with the State of Delaware, would have reasonable grounds to take 
serious issue with either obligation.150 
Thus, the IF model should survive legal scrutiny – so long as it 
sticks to the general and fiduciary duty of care obligations.  Further, the 
Khan/Pozen critique leaves open the probability that a true duty of 
loyalty can coexist with the business imperatives of entities willingly 
entering the market under such conditions. 
C. Zuckerberg Claims the Fiduciary Mantle 
As indicated earlier, Mark Zuckerberg has weighed in to suggest 
general support for the Balkin/Zittrain proposal.151 Moreover, he 
believes Facebook already is serving as a fiduciary to its end users. 
Zuckerberg has stated that “our own self image of ourselves and 
what we’re doing is that we’re acting as fiduciaries and trying to build 
the best services for people.”152 And later, “[o]ur self image is largely 
acting as – in this kind of fiduciary relationship . . . .”153 Apparently, as 
he describes it, the equation amounts to people choosing to use 
Facebook, and Facebook then building services it believes are best for 
them. 
 
149 Id. (emphasis in original). 
150 Khan and Pozen argue as well that a social media company like Facebook does not possess 
necessary attributes of loyalty, namely (1) access to a user’s most personal data, and (2) services 
of expertise.  Id. (manuscript at 18-20).  These arguments seem inapt.  To the extent the authors 
are attempting to undermine application of the supposed duty of loyalty underpinning the IF 
model, the attempt is unnecessary.  Nor, frankly, is the argument all that convincing on its 
merits.  Facebook plainly has ready access to a trove of personal user data, and also possesses 
singular expertise to utilize that data in myriad ways. 
151 See Zuckerberg Harvard Interview Transcript, supra note 14.  
152 Id. 
153 Id.  
2019] OLD SCHOOL GOES ONLINE  101 
It is unfortunate that the precise nature and scope of the supposed 
fiduciary obligation – whether Facebook is exercising a duty of care or 
a duty of loyalty – is not brought up in the interview.  Nonetheless, if 
Zuckerberg believes that Facebook already is acting as a fiduciary to 
its end users, even at the lower fiduciary duty of care level, the evidence 
suggests otherwise: 
• Lack of notice: Facebook has never expressed before this 
concept or defined its substance. As a result, its users have no 
ability to even understand, let alone negotiate or contest, the 
existence of an actual fiduciary relationship with the 
company. 
• Lack of legitimate consent: Facebook users have never given 
their express approval to become clients in a fiduciary 
relationship with the company. 
• Lack of substance: Facebook’s recent marketplace actions do 
not appear consistent with a fiduciary, even at the lowest level 
duty of care. 
• Lack of accountability: Facebook users have no direct 
recourse for possible violations of their fiduciary obligations. 
D. Choosing Our Words Well 
While the sheer expanse and depth of common law areas like 
fiduciary doctrine can be challenging, one upside is that its flexible 
nature can accommodate developing societal concerns. Indeed, Frankel 
points out that the common law is a relatively open-ended instrument 
for “allowing the acceptance of new fiduciaries into the field.”154 As a 
result, nearly any problem rooted in power relationships between 
people can be deemed a fiduciary problem.155 That would extend, it 
seems, to the dynamism of the World Wide Web in the early 21st 
Century. 
On the other hand, it is particularly crucial to have that public 
conversation now, rooted in the actual rationale of the equity and 
common law concepts of being a fiduciary. While the obligations in 
practice remain fraught around the edges, the core fiduciary duties of 
care and of loyalty should not be confused. As Zuckerberg’s recent 
statements only highlight, employing our legal language and concepts 
without sufficient precision can be problematic. Otherwise, there is a 
credible threat that as the terms enter into more common parlance 
among stakeholders, they will become misunderstood before having 
the opportunity to shed much-needed light.   
 
154 Frankel, supra note 56, at 183. 
155 Id. at 78.  
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In short, then, we should avoid, in the words of one scholar, “a 
sense of fiduciary so open as to be empty.”156 A nuanced understanding 
of the nomenclature, purpose, and application of fiduciary law doctrine 
can only better inform the larger public debate. 
IV. OPTING INTO A DEEPER LOYALTY: DIGITAL 
TRUSTMEDIARIES 
This Part proposes a new type of fiduciary, the digital 
trustmediary (or “DTM”), with scope, participants, and obligations 
intended to have particular relevance to the Web platforms era. Parts V 
and VI then will propose joining together the IF and DTM models in a 
common governance framework. 
The conjoined meaning embedded in the name should help 
explain its three key components. 
• The term “digital” is meant to connote that the scope – the 
“What” -- of its obligation runs broader and deeper than just 
an end user’s personal data or information. Indeed, potentially 
it would include all types of interactions in digital (meaning 
modern-day) environments, including those normally thought 
of as part of supportive human relationships. 
• The term “trust” is meant to invoke the relational essence of 
the fiduciary relationship – the “How” -- which is rooted in 
both proscriptive and prescriptive loyalty. The trust involves 
two particular kinds of fiduciary relationship – loyalty and 
confidentiality -- and the human trait of trustworthiness that 
the model seeks to embrace. 
• Finally, the term “intermediary” refers to the voluntary 
mediating role – the “Who” – that the entity plays, providing 
an active virtual interface between the user (who is now a 
client) and its digital experiences. 
The remainder of this Part will explore these considerations in 
more depth.   
A. The “Why” – Challenging Unbalanced Platform Markets 
The context for this proposal is important to understanding its 
potential relevance. 
My previous Hiding in the Open paper unpacked and examined 
the openness paradigm, as applied to a variety of natural and human-
 
156 Daniel Yeager, Fiduciary-isms: A Study of Academic Influence on the Expansion of the 
Law, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 179, 184 (2017) (emphasis in original). 
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made systems, networks, and platforms.157 There, I also described the 
rise of networked emergent technology (NET) platforms. The paper 
attributes the NET platforms’ incredible success to a combination of 
three interrelated factors: Web inputs (user data and content), Net 
effects (positive externalities, network effects, feedback loops, 
economies of scale), and Platform dynamics (the 
connectivity/communication function that bridges disparate sets of 
users).158 
From a functional standpoint, these platforms combine various 
Internet overlays (Web portals, mobile applications, computational 
systems) and underlays (networks, clouds, personal devices, sensing 
devices). These elements are mixed with considerable amounts of data, 
derived from users’ fixed and mobile online activities, and various 
“offline” activities (collected via environmental mechanisms: the 
Internet of Things, augmented reality, and robotics), as well as 
information inferred by machine learning algorithms.159 
Some of the largest multisided platforms have woven together all 
these powerful elements into highly lucrative, multidimensional 
ecosystems.160 They are premised on what Google’s Chief Economist, 
Hal Varian, has called in straightforward fashion the practice of “data 
extract[ing] and analy[zing].”161 
The concern is that these multidimensional ecosystems in essence 
are driving distinctly unbalanced platforms. The end user on one end 
of the platform has become, in Varian’s telling, the object of data 
extraction and analysis. The true subjects operate on the other ends of 
the platform: the data brokers and analyzers, including purveyors of 
advertising technologies (“adtech”) and marketing technologies 
(“martech”).162 While the end users do receive benefits, often in the 
form of “free” goods and services, they are paying through the 
extraction and analysis of their personal information, and its 
subsequent exposure to data brokers and others. 
 
157 Whitt, supra note 3, at 31-66. 
158 Id. at 66-70. 
159 Id. at 69. 
160 Shoshana Zuboff has labelled this a “behavioral futures market.” Shoshana Zuboff, The Age 
of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power 93-96 
(Jan. 15, 2019). 
161 Id. at 64.  Tim O’Reilly calls this equation the “Wall Street algorithm,” of using pervasive 
data surveillance to maximize user engagement, and platform company profits.  See generally 
TIM O’REILLY, WTF?: WHAT’S THE FUTURE AND WHY IT’S UP TO US (Oct. 10, 2017). 
162 Zuboff, supra note 160, at 94. 
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The thesis here is that this asymmetric treatment of stakeholders 
in the NET platforms ecosystem is not well serving the legitimate 
interests of many of its end users.163 As put elsewhere: 
One missing ingredient today appears to be basic human trust, 
an assurance that online interactions are founded on consent, 
accountability, and [transparency]. With new technologies of 
data control now coming online--the Internet of Things, cloud 
computing, A.I. and machine learning, augmented reality, 
biometrics and more—that existing trust and accountability 
deficit likely will get appreciably worse.164 
Why then should the hoary common law of fiduciaries law be 
relevant here? Because, if one believes the troubling narrative sketched 
out above, the situation is ripe for a market intervention, based on 
fostering trustworthy and accountable relationships. If we are to retain 
an “open” Web, trust is vital.  In turn, an “open” Web requires human 
agency, institutional accountability, and overall relational support – all 
of which are lacking in the current Web environment.165 
More to the point, the core elements of a fiduciary relationship are 
in play: 
• First, there is entrusted power. Online platforms and other 
OSPs have access to, and exercise discretionary power over, 
the significant practical interests (personal data, sensitive 
information, user-generated content, etc.) of the platform end 
users. 
• Second, the source of power in this instance is uniquely 
opaque. Who is doing what with my data typically is hidden 
from view or written ambiguously in privacy policies, with 
Web services rendered by complex algorithmic systems, 
under often-obscure terms of service. 
• Third, there is considerable skill and expertise involved in 
collecting, moving, storing, handling, analyzing, and 
otherwise utilizing personal data and information. 
• Fourth, there exists at least some modicum of trust, or 
otherwise users would not utilize various platforms’ services. 
Potential distrust often is overridden by the zero price services 
provided, and/or a lack of knowledge about the tradeoffs. 
• Finally, there is considerable risk of harm to users emanating 
from the entrustment, and their considerable reliance on 
OSPs. 
 
163 Whitt, supra note 3, at 74-75. 
164 Id. at 74. 
165 See GLIANET, www.glia.net (last visited Oct. 1, 2019).  
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Should these elements not be found to constitute a bona fide 
fiduciary relationship between an OSP and its end users, at minimum a 
torts-like general duty of care (“do no harm”) can offer some 
protections. Should some more limited form of relationship be 
established, the fiduciary duty of care of prudent conduct could be 
found to apply as well. Regardless, either one or both of those duties of 
care could be mandated by law, in ways consistent with corporate law 
and the U.S. Constitution. 
What then about the “thick” and “thin” versions of the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty? If compelled by law, such a duty may be 
unconstitutional, as the Khan/Pozen analysis demonstrates (and, if 
nothing else, the duty would be politically challenging to enact into law 
in the first place). Plus, as Frankel observes, forced loyalty is not true 
loyalty at all. 
Another option suggested here is to create a new Web ecosystem, 
based on entities voluntarily operating under the composite (thick) 
fiduciary duty of loyalty. This would include both forms of care, and 
both forms of loyalty, as well as an enabling duty of confidentiality. 
An enlarged role for government in the OSPs world seems 
inevitable. In the meantime, however – and ideally in concert – there is 
a role for the rest of us as well, in creating a new Web ecosystem, 
centered on more balanced digital platforms, governed by healthier 
incentive structures.166 If the community is indeed the critical asset of 
any multisided platform,167 the objective is to substantially improve the 
experience of its stakeholders.   
The digital trustmediary model, presented below, is one such 
proposed approach. One which “could pose worthy market alternatives 
to the more intrusive ‘Ads+Data World’ commercial model still 
underpinning many online platforms.”168 
B. Creating More True Fiduciary Relationships 
The “Why” analysis, provided above, does not differ appreciably 
from Balkin and other commentators. The DTM model does however 
rest on different responses to the “What” and “Who” and “How” 
queries.169 
 
166 Whitt, supra note 3, at 74. 
167 Id. at 67. 
168 Id. at 74. 
169 For additional and updated information on the concept of the digital trustmediary, and its role 
in the GLIAnet platforms ecosystem, see GLIANET, supra note 165. See also Richard Whitt, 
GLIAnet: A White Paper (February 2019 draft) (on file with author); Whitt, supra note 3, at 74. 
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The DTM model incorporates three core principles, with 
important relevance derived from fiduciary law. First, the relationship 
between client and agent is a broad one, taking on all aspects of modern 
digital life. Second, the relationship would be entirely voluntary, opted 
into willingly by both sides. Third, the relationship would entail a duty 
of loyalty, owed by the DTM to the now-entrustor/client. So, the 
relational element of the traditional fiduciary relationship is preserved, 
along with the notion of addressing entrusted power. The DTM model 
is intended to be a case of digital platforms done right. 
1. What: A Digital Life Support System 
In line with the “Why” of actively promoting the client’s interests, 
the DTM model entails providing robust support to clients. This 
support can take place at one or more different levels. 
The vision is broader than merely protecting against data-related 
harms. The model also encompasses an individual creating and 
building a relationship with a digital trustmediary that actively 
promotes that individual’s interests.170 One example is the extraction 
and analysis of personal data, which today is accomplished more or 
less surreptitiously. In a trusted and accountable relationship, raw data 
about myself can become relevant information, and even more relevant 
knowledge. With the assistance of a DTM, that knowledge then can be 
shared with others as part of a mutual, consensual exchange of value. 
There are several possible layers of functions, under attendant 
fiduciary duties, that the DTM can perform for its clients. These can be 
thought of as three separate tiers to protect, enhance, and promote, or 
“PEP.”  Optimally, through positive experiences at lower tiers, the 
 
170 Doc Searls’ longstanding work in furtherance of Vendor Relationship Management (VRM), 
including Customer Commons, is a guiding light in my conception of the DTM’s role in 
fashioning its clients’ “digital life support systems.”  See, e.g., SEARLS, https://www.searls.com 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2019) (Searls’ main website); Neil Davey, Doc Searls: VRM and the new 
tools of engagement, MYCUSTOMER (Jan. 25, 2010), 
https://www.mycustomer.com/selling/crm/doc-searls-vrm-and-the-new-tools-of-engagement (an 
early VRM posting); CUSTOMER COMMONS, https://www.customercommonsorg (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2019) (Customer Commons main website).  Yet another paradigm-shifting Searls 
conception is the so-called fourth party, which is intended to represent the customer’s interests.  
See Doc Searls, VPM and the Four Party System, PROJECT VRM (Apr. 12, 2019), 
https://blogs.harvard.edu/vrm/2009/04/12/vrm-and-the-four-party-system/. A useful analogy is 
the typical modern-day real estate transaction. The seller is deemed the first party, and the buyer 
the second party. Both the listing agent and the showing agent are third parties supporting the 
seller, even though they do not always appear that way to the unsuspecting buyer. Only in more 
recent times has the “buyer’s agent” appeared on the scene. In Searls’ parlance, that agent is the 
fourth party representing the buyer’s interests. Amidst the myriad of countless Web interactions 
and transactions, the DTM would occupy that fourth party role, in perpetual virtual orbit around 
its clients. 
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client would opt to have the DTM take on further functions on her 
behalf.  A virtuous cycle of trust would serve both sides well.    
Level One: Protect  
At a basic Level One, the DTM can provide fundamental client 
protection. This could range from taking on mundane but still-
important online tasks for clients, such as managing passwords, 
updating software, patching security holes, and establishing privacy 
settings. The DTM also could shoulder more daunting cognitive 
burdens to promote the client’s interests, such as analyzing and 
providing guidance concerning the terms of service (ToS) of websites 
and applications. On the duty side of the equation, this protection role 
matches up well with a general duty of care.  
Level Two: Enhance  
At a more advanced Level Two, the DTM could act as a filtering 
conduit, through which flows selectively all of the client’s interactions 
with the World Wide Web. The function could include the full 
protection and preservation of my data lifestream. This particular role 
could include establishing a virtual zone of trust and accountability to 
protect the individual from unwanted outside intrusions. In essence, the 
DTM would help present my enhanced human self to the digital world.  
This obligation is approximated by a “thin” duty of loyalty.  
Level Three: Promote  
Finally, at Level Three, the DTM could employ still more 
advanced and emerging technology tools to fully protect, enhance, and 
promote the client’s interests. This could include virtual avatars, 
personal cloudlets, sovereign identity layers, portable connectivity, 
modular devices, and preserved content.171 The “thick” duty of loyalty 
seems most apt here. 
One example of a Level Three-type function is the concept of an 
individual digital agent, sometimes called a “Personal AI.” 172 A DTM 
could arm its client with on-device computational software that could 
interact directly with so-called “Institutional AIs,” such as Amazon’s 
Alexa and Google’s Assistant. This Personal AI could perform a bevy 
of functions, including effectively protecting the client from unwanted 
digital surveillance, as well as promoting the client’s own intentions in 
the online environment.173 
 
171 See GLIANET, supra note 165.   
172 Throughout this paper, “AI” is abbreviated for “Artificial Intelligence.”  
173 This author’s recent series of articles makes the case for Personal AIs. Richard Whitt, 
Democratize AI (Part I), Medium (June 3, 2019), https://medium.com/swlh/democratize-ai-part-
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2.  Who: Opting In 
In this new dynamic, the Web user can enter into a legally-
binding, arm’s-length agreement with a trusted entity. Upon becoming 
part of this new commercial arrangement, this entity can be referred to 
as a digital trustmediary. As a client, I would agree to compensate this 
DTM in some manner for the services and technologies it provides to 
me, my family, and/or my various communities of interest. And in 
return, this entity pledges to fully represent my unique interests, to both 
the online and offline worlds.  
Because this model would be opted into voluntarily by both sides, 
it mirrors a “consent” approach from the fiduciary law tradition. As 
Frankel notes, “[f]iduciary services are best rendered voluntarily.”174  
Compelling an unwilling party to undertake such a relationship, on the 
other hand, can actually endanger the recipients and their interests.175 
In the first instance, the user would select one or more entities to 
become a digital trustmediary. Theoretically, at least, there would be a 
plethora of viable candidates. For example, leading companies in the 
tech space could capitalize on their existing trustworthiness with their 
customers. But others could vie for that relationship as well, including 
any entity with whom one has established trust. These options might 
entail for example a favorite television or radio broadcaster, or news 
organization, or retailer, or broadband provider. This may also include 
a local bank, library, church, university, food co-op, coffee shop, 
political party, or a governmental body. Or, an entity not yet born, 
including so-called distributed autonomous organizations (DOAs) 
based on blockchain platforms. The point is to begin with the core trust 
relationship, rather than the technology. 
3. How: Loyalty in Confidence to the Client 
As part of voluntarily taking on the role of a trusted intermediary, 
the DTM also would embrace the existence of a true fiduciary 
relationship. This opt-in decision would recognize the obvious 
fiduciary elements highlighted by Frankel and others,176 as well as 
elevate the “ancillary” duty of confidentiality to a role of overall 
enablement and enhancement. 
 
i-ade3cc7f727d; Richard Whitt, Democratize AI: The Personal AI (Part II), Medium (June 18, 
2019), https://towardsdatascience.com/democratize-ai-part-2-the-personal-ai-bedf819ace44; 
Richard Whitt, Democratizing AI (Part 3): Action plans for creating Personal AIs, Medium 
(July 1, 2019, https://medium.com/@whitt/democratizing-ai-part-3-efb8da5d956a. 
174 The Rise of Fiduciary Law, supra note 74, at 3. 
175 Id. at 4. 
176 See supra Part II. 
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In particular, under fiduciary duties of loyalty, the DTM and the 
client would have an actual understanding, freely agreed to by both 
sides. The client would receive all the tangible benefits of 
accountability and trust that a mutually beneficial services arrangement 
bestows. As a result, if the client is satisfied with the relationship, the 
trust level rises, and she then can be more willing to further engage 
with the DTM. In some cases, this could include an openness to share 
more of her personal information lifestream. That openness, in turn, 
creates more personal, social, and economic value, for both the client 
(relevant Web connections) and the DTM (relevant services). 
If it means anything, the supportive duty of confidentiality 
requires keeping information away from prying eyes.177 Because the 
DTM is rooted in a right relationship between client and agent, all the 
key elements of that relationship have been established in confidence, 
even before the individual has taken on that client status. What the 
client shares, and what the agent comes to learn (which may not be the 
same thing) would be subject to a confidentiality obligation. In real 
terms, this furthers the interests of both parties; as the client reveals 
more in confidence, the agent can better serve her interests. This feeds 
back into the openness dynamic engendered by loyalty – and the trust 
cycle reinforces.178 
Of course, human beings make mistakes, and can act with selfish 
intent. With the DTM, if the client is dissatisfied with something, she 
would have some recourse. As in any ordinary business relationship, 
there would be some form of accountability. Broken trust leaves the 
client the ability to pursue various options – reputational, market, 
and/or legal – to put things right.  One scholar has suggested for 
example that the FTC could exercise its Section 5 authority to find that 
inducement of misplaced trust is a “'deceptive business practice.”179 As 
will be discussed in Part VI infra, a professional accreditation or self-
certification regime is one governance avenue worth exploring for 
implementing this model. 
 
177 See RICHARDS, supra note 6, at 147-50 (describes a long legal tradition of confidentiality in 
the common law, and as an essential element of intellectual privacy). 
178 Glial cells, those human brain-based networks that protect, enhance, and promote healthy 
neural function, have become a touchstone metaphor for the author’s GLIAnet Project.  See 
generally GLIANET, supra note 165. Mike Godwin helpfully has pointed out the conceptual link 
as well between the important role of confidentiality in fiduciary relationships, and the 
supportive role of glial cells in the human brain. Godwin to Whitt Private Communication, 
supra note 142.  
179 WALDMAN, supra note 9 at 89. Of course, that same approach could be applied “where 
platforms leverage their design[s] to induce trust and then act against their members’ interests.” 
Id.  
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V. OLD SCHOOL GOES ONLINE 
This next section presents a provisional dive into whether and how 
these different sets of fiduciary duties, as instantiated in the IF and 
DTM models, can fit together in the online context. The intention is to 
apply these duties to a number of tangible real-world examples, in a 
way that provides useful guidance. 
A. A Range of Duties 
As we have seen from our discussion of fiduciary law in Part II, 
the common law suggests four basic types of obligations that could be 
applied to entities and their online activities. I would parse them out in 
the following way: 
• A general (tort-like) duty of care: “do no harm.” 
• A fiduciary (negligence-like) duty of care: “prudent conduct.” 
• A “thin,” proscriptive duty of loyalty: “no conflicts of 
interests or duties.”  
• A “thick,” prescriptive fiduciary duty of loyalty: “promote 
best interests.” 
These four sets of duties appear to constitute a continuum. They 
range from the less to the more contextual, and from the purely 
transactional of a minor traffic accident to the fully relational of a 
committed relationship.   
A fifth obligation, an enabling duty of confidentiality, also should 
be recognized. In some ways, keeping confidences is the connective 
tissue that binds together the other duties.180 At the same time, this 
particular obligation is contextual, based on the underlying duty being 
supported. In essence, the duty of confidentiality is like a ratchet, with 
varying degrees of protection – “thinness” or “thickness” – dependent 
on the nature and scope of the underlying fiduciary obligations.181 
For example, when added to the general duty of care, the duty of 
confidentiality is relatively limited – essentially, do not reveal things 
about me that would harm me in a tort-like manner. When added to the 
fiduciary duty of care, the obligation entails taking reasonable steps not 
to reveal information disclosed in confidence. Both of these somewhat 
narrow, “thin” interpretations make sense, as the duty of care tends to 
be more transactional than relational. 
 
180 Godwin to Whitt Private Communication, supra note 142.  
181 Other “ancillary” duties, such as good faith and candor, similarly can be defined more 
expansively, or more constrictively, depending on whether they are attaching/supporting the 
thick or thin version of the fiduciary duties of care and of loyalty. 
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Only when supplementing the duty of loyalty does the duty of 
confidentiality reach its full enabling power. The relational aspect of 
the client-agent bond is made plain in the injunction that all such 
confidences must be fully honored. This means not revealing the 
substance or even existence of such confidences to outside third parties 
not bound by the fiduciary relationship.  One can view this incarnation 
of the obligation as a “thicker” version, in parallel with the “thick” form 
of fiduciary loyalty. 
Given these parameters, the general duty of care should play out 
well in nearly any online situation, including where there is no 
preexisting contact or interactions between the parties. Even a limited 
form of confidentiality should apply in such contexts. By contrast, the 
three fiduciary duties should apply only where there is a preexisting 
“entrusted” relationship of power, expertise, reliance, and risk.182  
Thought of in another way, the duty of care creates an additional degree 
of accountability in existing institutions, while the duty of loyalty 
creates an additional degree of individual agency for new clients.  
How then do these duties play out in OSP practices and behaviors 
with regard to Web users? Largely it depends on the roles and functions 
involved. Under a “form follows function” model the author has 
employed elsewhere,183 a proposed test for fiduciary status would be 
based on the form of the relationship between two parties, and the 
specific functions to be provided. 
1. Medical Health Duties 
In functional terms, the physician-patient dynamic contains 
crucial elements to form a fiduciary relationship. These include: (1) an 
asymmetric power balance, based on the patient’s vulnerability; (2) 
acquiring and utilizing sensitive health information about the patient; 
(3) utilizing professional expertise to carry out specific tasks; and (4) 
the patient’s reliance on such expertise.  From these factors flows the 
composite or “thick” fiduciary duty of loyalty, plus a “thick” form of 
confidentiality, culminating in the fiduciary command to act in the 
patient’s best interests. 
 
182 One complication is that modern day legislators have adopted the term “fiduciary duties” – 
often referred to as “statutory duties” – which may or may not reach to actual equity-based 
fiduciary obligation standards. Edelman, supra note 83, at 21, 23.  The “prudent conduct” 
fiduciary duty of care is one such category where legislation would presume or assign what is 
called a fiduciary relationship. 
183 Whitt, supra note 3, at 74-78. See also Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment 
Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 652 (endorsing a “functionalist approach” to assigning 
and delineating fiduciary duties). 
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One useful way to think about differences between the duties is to 
compare them with a parallel in the medical field: the Hippocratic Oath.  
Basic principle of “first do no harm” (or, primum non nocere in Latin), 
have been associated for centuries with Hippocrates the Greek 
physician. Interestingly, the text passed down to us from ancient 
Greece uses a different formulation: “to abstain from doing harm,” also 
known as “nonmaleficence.”184 But the basic point is the same: 
physicians should endeavor above all not to harm their patients. That 
is a distinctly tort-like obligation, like the general duty of care. 
As it turns out, however, remaining portions of the Hippocratic 
Oath text provide detail about affirmative duties for physicians to 
attend to the sick. In other words, doctors should actually and 
deliberately help their patients. In a related medical text of that time 
(Epidemics, Book One), physicians are told essentially to accomplish 
two things: to do no harm, and to do good.185 The “golden axiom of 
Chomel” similarly breaks down medical obligations into two sets of 
rules. The “first law” is not to do harm, while the “second law” is to do 
good.186   
As a rough dichotomy, then, doing no harm correlates to the 
general duty of care, while doing good essentially is the fiduciary duty 
of loyalty. No harm could be considered a “negative” duty of restraint; 
doing good is an “affirmative” duty of action. Keeping private the 
confidentiality information revealed or gleaned about the client helps 
bind the duties closer together. 
2. “Digital Health” Duties 
To the extent that such care/loyalty distinctions from the medical 
world are illuminating, how would they be applied to the world of 
online data practices?  As we have seen in parsing Balkin’s IF model:  
• The general duty of care amounts to protecting against harm.  
In the digital environment, this would translate into: don’t 
deliberately leave my personal data unsecured, don’t sell my 
personal data to third parties you know likely will use it 
against me.  
• The higher fiduciary duty of care amounts to acting in a 
prudent manner in protecting my personal data, and my online 
 
184 Rancich AM & Gelpi RJ, Analysis of the ethical principles in medical oaths used by medical 
schools of Argentina in relation to the Hippocratic Oath, MEDICINA BUENO AIRES, 1998, 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9706247. 
185 Hippocrates, Of the Epidemics, THE INTERNET CLASSICS ARCHIVE, 
http://classics.mit.edu/Hippocrates/epidemics.1.i.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2019). 
186 Auguste Francois Chomel, REVOLVY, https://www.revolvy.com/page/Auguste-
Fran%C3%A7ois-Chomel (last visited Oct. 1, 2019). 
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content.  This would translate into: don’t be sloppy in securing 
my data on your server, don’t leave your server farms 
understaffed by poorly-trained employees. 
• The enabling “thin,” proscriptive version of confidentiality 
bolsters the care duties. This means, in essence: do not be 
imprudent or unreasonable in allowing third parties to gain 
unauthorized access to my private information, which they 
would then use to my detriment. 
The fiduciary duty of loyalty would demand more.   
• The thin proscriptive version tells the fiduciary: do not have 
any conflicts between your digital interests and my own, or 
between different sets of clients. Do not sell my personal data 
to the highest bidder. Do not program your AI to spy on me 
and acquire my data. 
• The thick prescriptive version sets the highest standard: 
actually promote my interests. Do inform me about online 
risks. Do keep my data in a super-safe location (i.e., not a 
vulnerable server farm). Do filter out harmful or unwanted 
content from my online feeds. Do arm me with technology 
tools to protect my interests. Do present me with advertising 
and marketing options tailored to my particular wants or 
needs – or, no ads at all.187 
• The enabling “thick,” prescriptive version of confidentiality 
provides additional protections to the client. Do affirmatively 
keep away from third parties all my information – from 
personal data, to private confidences, to inferred wants and 
needs – absent an explicit assent on my part. 
So, in terms of interacting with user data, the duty of care would 
cover protecting the user against harm arising from the fiduciary’s 
conduct, including third parties seeking to gain unauthorized access to 
the data. The duty of loyalty, by contrast, would cover protecting and 
promoting the user’s interests, and her personal information, over the 
fiduciary’s own interests. 
 
 
187 Seen in this light, Google’s longstanding “don’t be evil” mantra (since removed from its 
main website) sets a fairly low bar.  If companies merely can avoid becoming the equivalent of 
the Darth Vader of the Web, apparently that would be sufficient to meet the general (non-
fiduciary) duty of care standard.  In hindsight this fact should not be surprising, as Google (to 
my knowledge) never has claimed to be in a fiduciary relationship with its users.  As a corporate 
slogan, “do be good” or “helping you do better” would approximate the higher standards of 
conduct expected from a fiduciary relationship based on care and loyalty. 
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B. Voluntary Loyalty Surpasses Grudging Care 
The IF model’s “duty of care” promises to some degree to “lift all 
boats” (all OSPs) to a minimal standard of non-harmful and prudent 
conduct. The DTM model’s duty of loyalty standard by contrast (to 
maintain the analogy) seeks to “rebuild the levees,” by raising up the 
interests of one side of the existing online platforms: the end users.  
When introduced into some real-world scenarios, each approach shows 
its advantages, and its challenges. 
1. Comparative Upside 
The DTM model does provide some notable benefits.   
First, per the Khan/Pozen paper, the conflict of duties between 
users and stockholders they claim Facebook experiences would be 
problematic under a mandated duty of loyalty regime. This conflict 
derives from the fact that Facebook’s business model is already well-
established. Assumedly the company’s stockholders support 
Facebook’s ongoing market activities and data practices, which do not 
(obviously) involve a fiduciary duty of loyalty to its users. 
The same would not be the case, however, were an entity to take 
on its fiduciary obligations for the first time, and willingly, with full 
understanding and support from its stockholders. After all, the doctors, 
lawyers, accountants, and others cited in the Khan/Pozen paper, 
voluntarily joined their respective professions with already established 
codes of conduct and ethics. So, the DTM model survives intact that 
line of argument. Indeed, creating an “expectation of confidentiality” 
should give would-be clients a greater degree of trust to pursue 
fiduciary relationships with would-be DTMs.188 
Second, the DTM model effectively sidesteps Balkin’s animating 
concerns about potential First Amendment or Fourth Amendment 
challenges from enlisting unwilling participants to become IFs.189  
Once an entity of its own accord steps into the DTM role, the 
constitutional issues should diminish. 
While Balkin’s papers focus on the First Amendment implications 
of the information fiduciaries model, the Fourth Amendment angle is 
worth highlighting briefly. Under the “third party doctrine,” 
individuals typically lack protected Fourth Amendment interests in 
records that are possessed, owned, and controlled, by a third party.190  
With the United States Supreme Court’s recent Carpenter v. United 
 
188 Godwin to Whitt Private Communication, supra note 142. 
189 Information Fiduciaries, supra note 16, at 1209-1220. 
190 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
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States decision, 191 the underpinnings of that doctrine have been called 
into question.192   
Balkin states that “we should have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy for purposes of the Fourth Amendment” when we share 
information with information fiduciaries.193  In his view, then, the third 
party doctrine should not apply. However, because the IFs model is 
premised on a combination of general and fiduciary duties of care, and 
thin confidentiality, courts may be less likely to take IFs out of the 
third-party doctrine category. 
By introducing DTMs into the mix, however, the notion that 
individuals have a reduced expectation of privacy in information 
willingly shared with third parties is less likely to hold sway. In fact, if 
a client agrees to share information with a DTM acting as a professional 
fiduciary, bound by loyalty and confidentiality obligations, that client 
should have a heightened, not a reduced, expectation of privacy.194 
Future Fourth Amendment-related jurisprudence could well 
acknowledge that special constitutional status for DTM-like entities. 
Third, the DTM model provides an effective means of compliance 
with new government-imposed data protection mandates, such as the 
EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).195 Because the 
DTM need not actually own, control, or even possess its client’s data, 
applicability of the data controller and data processor requirements 
under the GDPR is questionable. Regardless, DTMs should be able to 
meet, if not exceed, their GDPR obligations. 
The GDPR is a notable achievement in furthering the cause of 
increased protection of European citizens’ personal data. That said, one 
can argue that the rules are a well-meaning but suboptimal fit for the 
growing complexities of the online era. Two observations are worth 
noting briefly here.   
 
191 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).   
192 Mike Godwin, What’s Next for the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?, SLATE  (June 27, 
2018, 3:28 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2018/06/after-the-supreme-courts-carpenter-
ruling-where-is-the-reasonable-expectation-of-privacy-heading.html.  
193 Information Fiduciaries, supra note 16, at 1231. 
194 See Kiel Brennan-Marquee, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 654-
55 (2015). (When A shares information with B to obtain a socially valuable service, B should be 
treated as an “information fiduciary,” so that B’s interactions with law enforcement are treated 
as a Fourth Amendment search.).  See also Mike Godwin, It’s Time to Reframe Our 
Relationship with Facebook, in THE SPLINTERS OF OUR DISCONTENT: HOW TO FIX SOCIAL 
MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY WITHOUT BREAKING THEM 34 (Zenger Press, May 14, 2019) 
(fiduciary status could bolster a company’s standing to resist government attempts to seize user 
data). 
195 EU GDPR.ORG, https://eugdpr.org/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2019). 
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First, the GDPR regime essentially accepts as given the current 
Web ecosystem, and the “transactional paradigm” of reducing human 
beings to conduits of static data points. Per the dominant theology of 
Silicon Valley, information about people is perceived to be a resource 
– much like oil – to be extracted and controlled and processed and, 
ultimately, monetized. Whatever its merits, such a perspective seems 
to crowd out other, more humanistic conceptions of personal data.196  
Further, by relying on extensive transparency measures, repeated 
consent notifications, and ex post compliance regimes, the GDPR puts 
the onus on the end user constantly to represent her best interests. 
“Consent fatigue” is bound to set in. Higher per-transaction costs and 
cognitive overload will be a major, if not debilitating, challenge to the 
GDPR construct.197 Many users in exasperation will simply resort to 
clicking through a growing raft of “notice and consent” messages – and 
in the process, potentially eroding actual real-world protections.198 As 
one scholar puts it, “there are reasons to doubt the invincibility of 
consent.”199 
In contrast to that transaction-focused approach, the DTM model 
is relational. This means that many consent-seeking, accountability-
establishing, and trust-building elements would be presented up front 
to potential clients, vis more human-friendly mechanisms. In essence, 
the relationship can buttress otherwise shaky foundations of the 
consensual.  
Interestingly, several scholars have proposed that privacy be 
viewed more aptly through the lens of human trust, including fiduciary 
 
196 One such alternate perspective is the so-called “lifestream”, conceived by the Author as an 
ever-evolving flow of individual and collective information rooted in human identity, 
relationship, and experience.  The pecuniary value of such flows is considered secondary to its 
value as a way to unlock human potential.   See GLIAnet, supra note 165.   
197 This drawback is all the more problematic in the Internet of Things (IoT) environment, where 
notice and the ability to register (lack of) consent seem all the more daunting. 
198 See A critical reflection on #GDPR, TANTE (Apr. 3, 2018), https://tante.cc/2018/04/03/a-
critical-reflection-on-gdpr/.  See also Larry Downes, GDPR and the End of the Internet’s Grand 
Bargain, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (Apr. 9, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/04/gdpr-and-the-
end-of-the-internets-grand-bargain. 
199 NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 2 (Apr. 4, 2019).  See also 
WALDMAN, supra note 9, at 83-85 (for many practical reasons, “notice-and-consent doesn’t 
work.”). 
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obligations. 200  “Put simply, privacy matters because it enables 
trust.”201 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the DTM model 
potentially disrupts and disperses incumbent economic power via 
market activities. More traditional “behavioral” regulation can have the 
unfortunate tendency to accept and lock in such power via regulatory 
compliance regimes.202 Concerns over an incumbent’s “regulatory 
lock-in advantage” have been raised as well regarding Europe’s 
GDPR.203 That same premise seemingly could extend as well to other 
regulatory regimes involving OSPs, and in particular large online 
platform companies.204 
2. Inevitable Tradeoffs 
By the same token, the DTM model – with its broader scope, 
heightened duties, and opt-in status – translates into new types and 
greater degrees of responsibilities. These inevitable tradeoffs warrant 
closer examination. 
First, the DTM model encompasses not just personal data, but all 
human interactions with the open Web and other ubiquitous digital 
platforms, both online and increasingly offline. This expansive 
purview obviously would require from the DTM more technical know-
how than would be the case in a purely data-focused regime. 
Second, the DTM model rests on a base of positive incentives and 
motivations, due to its reliance on voluntary, opt-in relationships 
between willing parties. This approach is consistent with the 
 
200 See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE 
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 199 (2009) (the lens of contextual integrity helps us conceive of 
privacy within “spheres of trust,” and Web companies operating in information caretaker or 
fiduciary roles). See also WALDMAN, supra note 9, at 85-88 (privacy-as-trust recognizes that 
data collectors are being entrusted with user information, which should require fiduciary 
obligations). See also Richards, supra note 6 (a new professional class of information fiduciaries 
should be required as a means of protecting our intellectual data).          
201 Richards & Hartzog, supra note 9, at 447. 
202 Cory Doctorow, Regulating Big Tech makes them stronger, so they need competition 
instead, THE ECONOMIST (June 6, 2019), https://www.economist.com/open-
future/2019/06/06/regulating-big-tech-makes-them-stronger-so-they-need-competition-instead; 
Larry Downes, How More Regulation for U.S. Tech Could Backfire, HARVARD BUSINESS 
REVIEW (Feb. 09, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/02/how-more-regulation-for-u-s-tech-could-
backfire. 
203 Doctorow, supra note 202.  
204 This reputed incumbency advantage for the large platform companies also speaks to the 
Khan/Pozen concern that a single-minded focus on fiduciary obligations will minimize or even 
negate the desire to pursue competition law-based remedies.  Khan & Pozen, supra note 15 
(manuscript at 5, 27-29).  
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observation that “forced loyalty may not be loyalty as such.”205  
However, that very voluntariness also means that, absent obvious 
incentives, entities are free to decide whether to become DTMs. 
Third, the DTM model provides a duty of loyalty, which better 
protects and promotes the interests of entrusting clients through newly 
active agents with real “skin in the game.”206 Again, this heightened 
standard would involve more responsibility and accountability for the 
DTM. 
So, given the considerably broader scope and substance of the 
fiduciary obligations – with greater client support, technology know-
how, and legal compliance costs/risks – one challenge may be in 
attracting sufficient number of entities willing to take on the mantle of 
a digital trustmediary. 
This concern is borne out by a 2004 thesis paper which explored 
various reasons for the failure of the infomediaries model earlier in this 
century.207 The author identified a number of new uncertainties for 
businesses looking into become such infomediaries, including the need 
to develop new online business models, pursue network-based lock-in 
effects, determine the value in intangible information assets, better 
understand their customers, and generate high levels of trust.208 Fifteen 
years later, many of these same uncertainties appear to be relevant 
considerations for building a healthy online ecosystem.209 
Some of those concerns could be overcome, however, from 
establishing attractive incentives for an entity to decide to opt into a 
DTM model. By leveraging existing trustworthiness with its clients, for 
example, the DTM can in theory gain (purely consensual) access to a 
client’s most valuable personal data and information, doubly protected 
 
205 Gold, supra note 89, at 393 (citation omitted).  See also Frankel, The Rise of Fiduciary Law, 
at 3 (“[f]iduciary services are best rendered voluntarily.”). 
206 See generally NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, SKIN IN THE GAME: HIDDEN ASYMMETRIES IN 
DAILY LIFE (Feb. 27, 2018). 
207 Bethany L. Leickly, Intermediaries in Information Economies, YUMPU (Apr. 30, 2004), 
https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/read/11549048/intermediaries-in-information-
economies-communication-culture- (a Master of Arts in Communication, Culture and 
Technology thesis, Georgetown University). A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate 
School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Arts in Communication, Culture, and Technology.  
208 Id. at 49-50.  The author lays out seven rules for infomediary success: provide value for both 
businesses and consumers, promote trust in online transactions, become experts in specialized 
areas, respect information privacy, achieve critical mass, gain first-mover advantage, and take 
advantage of information as a commodity.  Id. at 61. 
209 An even earlier market analysis – perhaps the first of its kind – details the economics of 
network-based information intermediaries, as “trustworthy information processing third 
parties,” mediating between information seekers and sources.  See FRANK ROSE, THE 
ECONOMICS, CONCEPT, AND DESIGN OF INFORMATION INTERMEDIARIES (1998). 
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by an enabling duty of confidentiality. The DTM model frees up 
opportunities to utilize new business models, such as quality 
advertising/marketing/branding arrangements, client intent-casting, 
monthly subscriptions, per-transaction fees, and tokenized data access. 
Other advantages could accrue. Incumbents with existing 
customers or subscribers can use the DTM model to create more 
“stickiness” in those relationships. Technology-savvy entities can 
leverage the cutting-edge tech tools, like Personal AIs, as a way to 
attract early adopters and others. More social-minded entities can 
perceive the DTM loyalty obligations as another way to serve the 
higher goals of the organization. As a result, a raft of governance 
models (b-corps, platform cooperatives, blockchain foundations, etc.) 
can be explored. And, if nothing else, the fear of being left behind in 
the digital economy may propel some entities to consider the DTM 
model as a way of gaining new market relevance.210 
The other major concern is that, on the end user side of the DTM 
platform, there would be an insufficient number of willing clients. The 
Leickly study observes that consumers too face new uncertainties in 
the growing e-commerce space, including information overload 
(difficulty in differentiating between trustworthy and opportunistic 
businesses), information asymmetry (inability to process relevant 
information), technology weariness (prevalence of malfunctions, 
failures, and hacks), and the moral hazard of reduced privacy online.211  
Again, these concerns seem near-universal in the modern online world.  
In particular, the opacity of the existing information asymmetries and 
platform imbalances may not be readily discernible to the average Web 
user. Surmounting these uncertainties will be crucial in order for an 
actual DTMs-based ecosystem to take hold and succeed. 
At bottom, then, the two visions have countervailing challenges.  
A world of IFs may include too many of the unwilling, while a world 
of DTMs may contain too few of the willing. This tension need not be 
resolved decisively in one direction or the other. Instead, as we will see 
in Part VI, the two models can be accommodated to the benefit of the 
participants in both regimes. 
 
 
 
210 As explained above, in the age of GDPR, and future international, national, and/or state data 
protection and privacy regimes, one should not overlook the legal and regulatory compliance 
advantages that would accompany adoption of the DTM model. 
211 Leickly, supra note 206, at 49-50. 
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C. A Cautionary Note: Zuckerberg and the Spectre of 
Competition 
In his February 2019 interview at Harvard, Mark Zuckerberg 
draws a fascinating, if overlooked, contrast between people who would 
be greatly empowered by the ability to choose their Web-based 
intermediary, and the role of large platform companies: 
If you have a fully distributed system, it dramatically 
empowers individuals on the one hand, but it really raises the 
stakes and it gets to your questions around, well, what are the 
boundaries on consent and how people can really actually 
effectively know that they’re giving consent to an institution? 
In some ways it’s a lot easier to regulate and hold accountable 
large companies like Facebook or Google, because they’re 
more visible, they’re more transparent than the long tail of 
services that people would choose to then go interact with 
directly.212 
Zuckerberg seems to believe that an assertion of serving his users’ 
interests should trump market interventions to give people additional 
options. In fact, he all but invites government regulation. Per the 
incumbent lock-in concerns mentioned previously, that policy 
prescription might well end up maintaining Facebook’s current market 
position with users. An alternative is to open up the market to “the long 
tail” of entities that people willingly and expressly want to select to 
“dramatically empower” them. The DTM model is one approach to 
bridge the accountability gap that Zuckerberg raises as an obstacle to 
achieving that promising scenario. 
One option consistent with the Khan/Pozen critique is to 
affirmatively prohibit OSPs – or at least those exhibiting non-fiduciary 
practices – from taking on an affirmative duty to loyalty under their 
current business models and corporate obligations. Their paper 
demonstrates that the tension between the fiduciary duty of loyalty, and 
the online platforms’ existing financial incentives and corporate 
priorities, may be too deep to resolve without fundamental reforms.213  
The exact duties of a fiduciary relationship between two parties 
depends first on the actual function to be provided. This “form follows 
function” approach would be violated by an entity, such as Facebook, 
that assumes the mantle of trust, without providing the necessary 
loyalty regarding their entrusted power over purported entrustors.  
 
212 Zuckerberg Harvard Interview Transcript, supra note 14. 
213 Khan & Pozen, supra note 15 (manuscript at 10-17).  
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Unless and until that functional “failure” were to be corrected, the duty 
of loyalty should not apply. 
VI. A WAY FORWARD: THE “WHICH/WHERE/WHEN” OF 
IMPLEMENTATION 
A. Two Complementary Tiers 
Adopting a multi-tiered approach containing both the IF and DTM 
models has some support in fiduciary law doctrine. As Richard Brooks 
puts it, “a fully developed model of the concept of an information 
fiduciary would incorporate both the affirmative and negative duties 
suggested by Laudon and Richards.”214 
The structural pluralism school also provides some useful 
guidance. Ideally, law should protect our core interests, while at the 
same time, allowing latitude for people to engage in autonomous 
behaviors. To Dagan and Hannes: 
People should be able to choose from these institutions in line 
with their own conceptions of the good and the means 
necessary for its realization given their particular needs and 
circumstances. . . . This fundamental commitment to self-
authorship . . . accommodate[s] heterogeneity. . . . [T]o the 
extent possible, private law should attempt to overcome 
problems of information asymmetry and cognitive biases by 
prescribing sticky defaults rather than by curtailing choice 
through mandatory rules.215 
This observation suggests that a two-tiered fiduciary approach is 
a doable way to protect the downside user risks, while enabling the 
upside mutual benefits. In fact, each duty can in important ways 
reinforce the other; for example, by building online human agency on 
top of institutional accountability. While an imposed duty of care 
facilitates higher degrees of accountability by existing OSPs, a 
voluntary duty of loyalty supplies individuals with new agency as 
empowered clients. As we also have seen, in the common law, the 
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty interact with and bolster one 
another by promoting best interests through their composite bundle of 
“thick” duties. After all, sheer “loyalty” in the absence of any sense of 
“care” does not necessarily guarantee the moral quality of the actions 
that are informed by it.216 Nor does loyalty have much meaning where 
 
214 Brooks, supra note 78, at 240. 
215 Dagan & Hannes, supra note 91, at 115.  
216 Irit Samet, supra note 105, at 128. 
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private information and confidences routinely are revealed to 
unaffiliated third parties. 
So, a mandated duty of care plus “thin” duty of confidentiality 
could apply to those OSPs involved generally in personal user data, 
while a voluntary duty of loyalty plus “thick” duty of confidentiality 
could be adopted for those entities opting into direct, accountable 
relationships with clients. Among other advantages, combining the IF 
and DTM models in two separate tiers would provide the basis for 
parties to explore and adopt a graduated set of obligations. 
Getzler observes that fiduciary law can serve as a protective, 
relatively stringent “penalty default rule,” with parties able to negotiate 
downward from there.217 The suggestion here, however, would go the 
other way: to adopt the “default rule” of a duty of care, and then allow 
parties to negotiate upward to a higher duty of loyalty while supporting 
confidentiality. This would accommodate, among other things, the 
legal and political challenges of gaining adoption of a loyalty standard, 
per the Khan/Pozen analysis. 
B. Implementing the IF Model 
In the United States, Federal legislation appears to be a leading 
implementation option for the IF model. A notable example came about 
in December 2018, when U.S. Senator Brian Schatz, along with 
fourteen co-sponsors, introduced Senate Bill 3744, the “Data Care Act 
of 2018.”218 Section 3 of the bill lays out the specific duties of OSPs 
with regard to personal data. Three sets of obligations are enunciated. 
• Duty of care: The OSP must reasonably secure data from 
unauthorized access and provide prompt notice of data 
breach. 
• Duty of loyalty: The OSP may not use data in any way that 
would benefit the OSP to the detriment of the user, would 
result in reasonably foreseeable and material physical or 
financial harm; or would be unexpected and highly offensive 
to the user.  
• Duty of confidentiality: The OSP may not disclose or sell 
individual identifying data except as consistent with the duties 
of care and loyalty. 
S.3744 specifies that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the 
relevant regulatory agency to oversee its implementation. The FTC 
may exempt certain categories of providers, services, and data, 
 
217 Getzler, supra note 81, at 61. 
218 The Data Care Act of 2018, supra note 11 (introduced December 12, 2018).  
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including conducting a cost/benefit analysis. State attorney general 
(AGs) also could become involved, via civil actions against OSPs. 
The proposed Data Care Act seeks to grapple head-on with 
applying various fiduciary-based duties to OSPs. To that end, it is a 
laudable contribution to the conversation, and potentially a useful 
vehicle to bring to life the IF model. In one respect, however, the 
legislation should be modified to avoid conflating the OSPs’ duty 
standards. 
As indicated above, the bill’s duty of care provision essentially 
mirrors the general (tort-like) and fiduciary duties of care. Reflecting 
the way that Balkin has articulated the IF model, however, the bill then 
appropriates the duty of loyalty mantle for what amounts to an 
additional set of duty of care obligations. For example, the duty of 
loyalty provision mistakenly encompasses carrying out existing 
services while merely avoiding harm. Further, the bill’s duty of 
confidentiality lacks explicit content, instead tying a non-disclosure 
requirement to carrying out the other two duties. To maintain a 
doctrinally consistent approach, the bill text should clarify that its 
requirements amount to the more limited reach of “do no harm” and 
“prudent conduct” duty of care obligations, and a “thin” version of 
confidentiality, and does not entail as well a fiduciary duty of loyalty.219  
That said, the proposed Data Care Act is a good start in the United 
States.  That or similar Federal legislation could become the vehicle for 
adopting general and fiduciary duties of care, applicable to the broad 
range of OSPs and their data-related activities. As discussed above, 
such legislation could include functional openness provisions as well, 
which would help pave the way for a robust alternative market of 
digital trustmediaries. 
As it turns out, such bi-partisan legislation was just introduced.  
Senate Bill 26581, the ACCESS (“Augmenting Compatibility and 
Competition by Enabling Service Switching”) Act, was introduced on 
October 22, 2019 by U.S. Senators Mark Warner (D-VA), Josh Hawley 
(R-MO), and Richard Blumenthal. (D-CT).220 The bill combines 
several functional openness provisions, with recognition of “custodial” 
third parties operating on behalf of users under specified care-like 
duties. The bill’s sponsors recognize that empowering digital 
intermediaries with “portability, interoperability, and delegatability. . . 
 
219 As observed above, mandating by law a relational fiduciary duty of loyalty would be 
impractical, likely running afoul of constitutional, political, and commercial pushbacks. 
220 Press Release, Mark R. Warner, Senators Introduce Bipartisan Bill to Encourage Competition 
on Social Media (Oct. 22, 2019), 
https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2019/10/senators-introduce-bipartisan-bill-to-
encourage-competition-in-social-media.     
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will help put consumers in the driver’s seat when it comes to how and 
where they use social media.”221 
Specifically, the ACCESS Act would requires large platform 
companies to operate interfaces allowing users to access and port their 
data, as well as interfaces facilitating interoperability with third 
parties.222 The legislation further allows users to delegate management 
of their online interactions to “custodial third party agents.”223 Those 
agents in turn would abide by specified duties, including reasonably 
safeguarding user data, and not accessing such data in ways that would 
harm the user.224 
C. Implementing the DTM Model 
1. Accountability: Codes and Certifications 
A noteworthy advantage of the DTM model is that it need not be 
adopted via prescriptive legislation, managed through challenging 
political processes.225 Instead, interested entities and individuals can 
begin now to establish DTM relationships, as anchors to a more 
trustworthy and accountable Web ecosystem. 
These DTM relationships can be bolstered by a number of 
overarching institutional accountability measures.226 Among other 
benefits, the existence of such accountability and compliance 
mechanisms can help reduce entrustors’ risks.227 For example, entities 
on their own can adopt and implement best practices, codes of practice 
or conduct, or self-certification regimes. Similarly, groups of such 
entities could coordinate via industry associations, certification bodies, 
and/or multi-lateral stakeholder coalitions. 
2. Accountability: Professional Status 
Another interesting path to consider is creating an entirely new 
profession for digital agents. Much like a physician or an attorney, the 
 
221 Id.   
222 See S. 26581, 116th Cong. §§ 2, 3 (2019), 
https://www.scribd.com/document/431507473/GOE19968.   
223 Id. at § 5.  
224 Id. While the accompanying press release specifies that the bill includes “a strong duty of 
care” for third party custodians, the actual text does not invoke by name any particular standard. 
225 That said, the DTM model also could be recognized in some fashion by the U. S. Congress, 
and/or state legislatures, as a viable common law-style option. 
226 Richard Whitt, Adaptive Policymaking: Evolving and Applying Emergent Solutions for U.S. 
Communications Policy, 61 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL 483, 521-526 (2009) 
(selecting appropriate institutional approach for particular policy situations) (hereinafter 
Adaptive Policymaking); Whitt, supra note 3, at 74-78. 
227 Frankel, supra note 56, at 31. 
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digital fiduciary agent would hold itself out as the member of a 
professional guild of experts. As one example, Jerry Kang and others 
have suggested that “personal data guardians” play an intermediary 
role in the information ecosystem, complete with “a professional 
identity of expertise and service.”228 The core of this new profession 
would be to act as a client’s trustworthy confidante, zealous advocate, 
and wise counsellor.229 In other words, this profession could be 
founded on a digital trustmediary’s thick fiduciary duty of loyalty and 
enabling confidentiality obligation. 
Treating the DTM as its own profession, complete with 
enforceable codes of conduct, also can qualify for special treatment 
under the U.S. Constitution. Godwin has argued that a statutory and/or 
professional framework of fiduciary obligations should offer a DTM-
like entity a similar special legal status as a doctor or a physician. In 
turn, that entity should have legal standing to defend its clients’ Fourth 
Amendment rights against government seizures of personal 
information, and its clients’ First Amendment rights of speech and 
privacy.230 To the extent this analysis proves correct, a professional 
DTM becomes all the more attractive to would-be clients. 
Balkin has argued that OSPs should not abide by higher fiduciary 
obligations because consumers do not expect from them such doctor-
like duties. While that may well be true in this particular moment (and 
it is unclear that user expectations should be a deciding factor 
regardless), that need not be the case going forward. Social norms and 
values and expectations change and continue to evolve over time.  
Establishing a new digital agency profession, complete with a full 
panoply of fiduciary duties, can materially elevate those societal 
perspectives. 
3. Inducements: Public Policy Elements 
One also can imagine parallel implementation efforts across a 
myriad of public policy and market systems. For example, the IF duty 
of care/thin confidentiality model can become the ground floor 
obligation for certain Web-based entities, perhaps pursued as part of 
Federal data protection and privacy legislation in Congress. At the 
same time, the DTM duty of loyalty/thick confidentiality model can 
become a key inducement presented to entities vying for actual clients. 
 
228 Jerry Kang, Katie Shilton, Deborah Estrin, Jeff Burke, & Mark Hansen, Self-Surveillance 
Privacy, 97 IOWA L. REV. 809, 828 (2012). 
229 Id. at 828-29. See also Godwin, supra note 194, at 34-35 (suggests forming professional 
associations of personal information trustees).   
230 Id.  
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Nonetheless, some OSPs, and large platform companies in 
particular, may well resist having DTMs enter the Web marketplace.  
Such resistance could extend to refusing to engage in meaningful 
commercial transactions or provide functional access to necessary 
platform inputs. In those instances, some policy assistance may be 
required. This could include a mix of tailored market inputs and 
incentives.   
Previously the author has described how “functional openness,” 
born out of regulatory policies developed at the FCC, has facilitated 
new communications and information services markets by “opening 
up” underlying platform resources.231 Via nondiscriminatory software-
based interfaces, such regulated business inputs (RBIs) can include 
new rights to interconnection, interoperability, and data portability, 
under fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) conditions.232 
The ACCESS Act legislation discussed above incorporates several of 
these functional openness measures, albeit as part of a voluntary duty 
of care-type regime. Other functional, structural, behavioral, 
procedural, and informational safeguards, to protect both consumers 
and competition, may be useful as well.233 
VII. LOOKING AHEAD: DIGITAL COMMON LAW?  
Of course, the information fiduciaries debate is not occurring in a 
vacuum. Even as we examine the prospects of applying specified duties 
of care and of loyalty to certain OSP practices, there are larger 
conversations yet to be had. This academic-seeming discussion should 
not overlook the percolating market and technology activities that 
already are reshaping portions of the digital landscape. Nor should we 
neglect possible ways of stringing together disparate legal elements 
into a coherent whole – namely, a digital common law. 
A. A Bigger Canvas 
Many emerging forms of human/technology mediation call for 
greater coherence in our legal and policy thinking. For example, 
potential governance models include the “data trust,” a group of 
collective stewards of shared data, under a legal trust arrangement, 
forming an ecosystem with differing business models and terms.234  
 
231 Whitt, supra note 3, at 75. 
232 Whitt, supra note 3, at 73-76.  See also U.S. Senator Mark Warner, Potential Policy 
Proposals for Regulation of Social Media and Technology Firms (July 30, 2018), discussed at 
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Related models include the “civic trust,”235 as well as the “civic data 
trust” being championed by Alphabet’s Sidewalk Labs.236 Others have 
been investigating as well the concept of a “data co-op.”237 
In terms of novel data-centric business models, examples include 
the “PIMs” (personal information managers) in the United Kingdom,238 
and Jaron Lanier’s “MIDs” (mediators of individual data).239 Another 
approach is utilizing so-called “reverse meters,” where businesses 
compensate users with data/attention credits.240 
Privacy-enhancing technology implementations also abound.  
These include Sir Tim Berners-Lee’s SOLID PODs (personal online 
data stores),241 Holochain’s distributed computing platform,242 
digi.me’s personal data manager,243 and countless others. Ongoing 
businesses should not be ignored, such as DuckDuckGo (search 
engines),244 Firefox and Brave (Web browsers),245 Signal (text app),246 
Mycroft (personal voice AI agent),247 and more. 
The heterogeneity of these approaches is staggering. And yet, the 
commonality is that all these disparate businesses and technologies are 
crafting novel forms of privacy and autonomy-enhancing mediation 
practices between end users and the Web. Can we consider the utility 
of organizing, and even coordinating, all this burgeoning activity, 
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under a single legal roof? In short, can we develop what amounts to a 
digital common law? 
B. A Bigger Framing 
A parting thought is to explore, in the United States and 
elsewhere, the potential for a grand synthesis of public policy, legal, 
and regulatory elements. 248 Beginning with the fiduciary duties of care 
and of loyalty, one suggestion is to come up with what would amount 
to a digital common law. This would be a way of defining and applying 
more nuanced, effective versions of traditional common law principles, 
for all forms of digital activities.249  
Already one can perceive viable use cases. As one example, a 
shortcoming shared by both the IF and DTM models is that the 
fiduciary protections extend only to those entities’ “first party” users 
or clients. It is unclear how best to protect clients from unwanted “third 
parties,” such as data brokers, who somehow have gained non-
consensual access to personal information.250 To help remedy that 
scenario, one author suggests extending the IF model to cover the sale 
and storage of data.251 Balkin himself proposes another approach, 
which is adopting a new concept he calls “algorithmic nuisance,” 
borrowed from tort law.252  
Other uses of tort law are possible. William Prosser first 
established the “privacy torts” of disclosure, false light, appropriation, 
and intrusion – a category recently expanded on by Richards as 
“information torts.”253  
An additional possibility is to use the general theory of 
misappropriation to cover the exploitation of personal data in one’s 
possession (akin to a “data insider trading” prohibition). The larger 
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point is that the depth and richness of the traditional common law could 
be useful in filling in various gaps in existing laws and regulations.  
An intriguing path was suggested in the Supreme Court’s recent 
Carpenter decision.254 There, in a dissenting opinion, Justice Gorsuch 
recommends exploring the use of the “positive” or common law of 
bailments – where third parties temporarily hold personal property on 
one’s behalf – as an alternative basis for Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. In particular, he notes how bailment law could be 
modified to suit the digital age, a perspective this author previously has 
articulated for broadband access platforms.255 As Justice Gorsuch puts 
it, “[j]ust because you entrust your data – in some cases, your modern-
day papers and effects – to a third party may not mean you lose all 
Fourth Amendment interest in its contents.”256 He suggests that even in 
the absence of a formal agreement between the data owner and its 
possessor, the possessor may be a “constructive bailee” under an 
involuntary bailment.257  
A blend of common law doctrines could be useful to consider 
here. As bailment has its common law roots in the protection of private 
property, perhaps it could be appropriated for an individual’s 
information instantiated as digital bits “at flight or at rest” – namely, in 
data streams that course through telecommunications networks and 
reside on cloud servers. By contrast, fiduciary law runs with the person, 
and her confidences, and so could provide a useful analogue for 
information/knowledge provided in more relational contexts.  
Regardless, Justice Gorsuch’s reach for constitutional guidance from 
the common law is a novel, and potentially constructive, way to map 
some old school rules to scenarios involving emerging digital 
technologies. 
A clear advantage in devising a digital common law is that the 
groundwork has existed, in some cases, for many hundreds of years.  
Likely piece parts already have been proposed, or simply are waiting 
to be rediscovered. Without offering here a critique, a few such options 
could include: 
• General duty of care, based on negligence standards;258 
 
254 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2206-2223.  
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• Statutory duty of care for websites posting “user-generated 
content;”259  
• “Duty to deal”260 (applicable to platform company 
“bottlenecks”); 
• “Functional openness” requirements (wholesale market 
inputs); and 
• Bailment obligation (data carriage and storage).261  
In the United States, these and other learnings could be adopted 
and applied by existing agencies, such as the FTC, the FCC, and the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). While each 
agency has its own charter and processes for addressing the technology 
issues within its purview, reliance on elements of common law doctrine 
should not be too great a conceptual or procedural stretch. As Justice 
Gorsuch’s analysis also shows, judicial bodies too can look to 
traditional common law as a prism for resolving complex digital issues. 
CONCLUSION: DIGITAL LOYALTY THROUGH THICK AND THIN 
The debate over information fiduciaries highlights an important 
truth: the future needs the past. Common law does indeed have useful 
things to contribute to modern day concerns about the role of digital 
technologies in our society. As Brooks puts it, the application of 
fiduciary principles “will continue to grow and acquire salience,” as 
policymakers and others “borrow doctrine from fiduciary law to 
regulate the possession and sharing of knowledge in our increasingly 
information-dense world.”262 The Balkin/Zittrain “information 
fiduciaries” proposal is a worthy contribution to the challenges of 
dealing with the entrusted relational power of various data-based online 
entities.   
At its best, “[f]iduciary law is attuned to human nature.”263 An 
important societal conversation now is underway over whether and 
how online service providers and multisided online platforms should 
abide by fiduciary obligations as they provide their services to us. The 
jury of public opinion remains out on those questions. 
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The perspective here is to embrace some lessons from human 
experience, and clear away growing doctrinal confusion, without 
necessarily adopting a slovenly obeisance to the past. Hopefully 
interested stakeholders – from businesspeople to technologists to 
policymakers – can incorporate useful takeaways into their future 
plans, while the rest of us can begin elevating our collective 
expectations of what it means to be a digital participant in the 21st 
Century. 
We need not wait however to begin making real progress to 
protect and promote the interests of Web users. Those users deserve 
options that embrace standards of care, loyalty, and confidentiality, 
which treat them like actual clients. The digital trustmediaries model 
in particular can usher in a more balanced and healthy platforms 
dynamic, bringing together willing participants bound by mutual 
benefit and – yes – trust. 
 
